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Abstract 
There are many challenges to make micropayment systems on the Internet work as 
reliably, safely and efficiently as they need to. I have studied many of these problems, 
and seen how different researchers have tried to solve the challenges. A summary of 
many of these problems and suggested solutions are presented in this thesis. 
A new micropayments system is presented, based on Merkle's authentication tree and 
Wintemitz's one-time signatures. The scheme can add efficiency and flexibility to a 
range of existing micropayment schemes based on hash chains. Unlike earlier system, 
hash chains can be made relatively short, since the computational cost of 
authenticating a new hash chain is made small. 
An implementation of suggested micropayment system has been done; this is new. An 
implementation of the Wintemitz signature scheme has also been made. This 
signature scheme is mostly discussed only in theory in the literature, and only a few 
implementations exist. Both the Wintemitz signature scheme and the new payment 
system have been tested for time and space requirements and compared favourably to 
well known signature systems like DSA and RSA. With optimal settings, a Wintemitz 
signature can be done 14 times as fast as DSA (1024) and 28 times as fast as RSA 
(1024). 
Storage requirements are a problem for the Wintemitz signatures. A second 
implementation was therefore made, focusing on this problem. The storage required 
by the signer was thus reduced by a factor of about 28 by sacrificing some signature 
speed. 
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The introduction of the web browsers in 1993 changed the Internet considerably. All 
of a sudden everybody with a computer could navigate the World Wide Web, and it 
was no longer an exclusive club for computer people. It didn't take long before 
businesses started to use the Internet to promote themselves, and to sell goods and 
services. This development has exploded in the last few years, and will keep on going 
at an accelerated speed for years to come. 
Being able to perform payments and trust them to be secure is a vital part of a 
business infrastructure. A lot of research has been undertaken into making payments 
secure on the Internet. Computationally demanding cryptography, and especially 
public key cryptography are means by which security is achieved, but there are still a 
lot of challenges ahead. 
One particular category of electronic payments is called micropayments. These are 
payments with a very small value, typically from less than a cent to a few dollars. A 
large number of transactions are expected to be made since each payment is worth so 
little. This means that a higher level of efficiency is required than for other (macro-) 
payment systems. It is a major challenge to make the micropayment systems 
computationally efficient enough while keeping the appropriate level of security. It 
seems to be the view of the crypto-community that public-key signatures are too 
computationally expensive, and other methods must be found instead. Several 
schemes use one-way hash functions to obtain the desired speed and efficiency. Both 
Rivest and Shamir [Ri,Sh'96], and Anderson, Manifavas and Sutheriand [An, Ma, 
Su'97] use hashing to produce the actual tokens. Glassman, Manasse, Abadi, Gauthier 
and Sobalvarro [Milli'95], use hashing to authenticate the payments by utilising 
Message Authentication Codes (MACs). 
1.1 Contributions made in this thesis 
Many papers have been written on micropayments (most of them after 1996). I have 
studied a variety of these and collected the different problems, concerns and 
suggested solutions to given problems discussed in different systems. Naturally, 
several researchers address the same issues, but they address them in different ways 
with different perspectives. It can be difficult to get a full overview of what has and 
what has not been done. A summary of how some of these papers intend to solve 
various problems can therefore be very useful for people intending to study the field 
of micropayments. 
Possible improvements to micropayments based on hash chains are suggested. A 
framework for a payment system is given, where the Wintemitz one-time signatures 
are used. The system offers flexibility to existing payment systems. 
I have made an implementation of the Wintemitz one-time signature as a part of the 
suggested payment system. This signature scheme is often considered to be only of 
theoretical value, but modifications have been done to make it's use feasible. With the 
right conditions, a signature can be made about 28 times as fast as an RSA (1024) 
signature [Ri, Sh, Ad78], and 14 times as fast as a DSA (1024) signature. DSA 
(Digital Signature Algorithm) is a defined in the U.S. Federal Information Processing 
Standard FIPS 186, named the Digital Signature Standard (DSS). 
1.2 Outline of this thesis 
Chapter 2 discusses the background material. A few of the cryptographic primitives 
and functions used in this thesis are described. Background on conventional (macro-) 
payment systems is also provided. 
Chapter 3 is the summary of micropayment systems mentioned in Section 1.1. Some 
of the major issues and their suggested solutions are described and discussed. 
Chapter 4 is a description of the Merkle one-time signature, the Wintemitz one-time 
signature and the Merkle authentication tree. These structures are used in the 
suggested payment system. 
Chapter 5 describes the suggested payment system mentioned in Section 1.1. 
Modifications are done to the Merkle authentication tree and the Wintemitz signature 
scheme. Properties that can be gained by using the suggested improvements are listed. 
Chapter 6 describes the details of the implementation mentioned in Section 1.1. Data 
for signature sizes and operation time are presented. 





2.1 Technical background 
2.1.1 Cryptographic functions 
One-way functions 
A one-way function (Diffie and Hellman, [Di, He76]) is informally a function that is 
easy to compute, but hard to invert. If F is a one-way function, then it is easy to 
oom^uiQ y=F(x). However, given and F, it is difficult to compute x. 
One-way hash functions 
One-way hash functions, OWHF are a special family of one-way functions. A hash 
function produces a finite length digest of an arbitrarily long message, Merkle 
[Me'89]. A OWHF is often called a weak one-way hash function in cryptographic 
literature, Menezes, van Oorschot and Vanstone [Me, Oo, Va'97]. Hash flmctions are 
often written with a script font, and ^T/'will be used throughout this thesis. 
Collision resistance 
Hash functions that are used in cryptography often needs to be collision resistant. 
Collision resistance can be defined as ([Me, Oo, Va'97]): 
"Collision resistance - it is computationally infeasible to find any two distinct inputs x 
and x' which hash to the same output, i.e., such that H(x) = Hfx'):' 
Collision-resistant hash functions (CRHF) are often called strong one-way hash 
functions in cryptographic literature [Me, Oo, Va'97]. 
Digital signatures 
Digital signatures (public key) was first suggested by Diffie and Helman, [Di, He76], 
and later explored by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman in [Ri, Sh, Ad78]. Much research 
has been done in this area. Look in the [Me, Oo, Va'97], for a good covering of the 
topic. 
A signature scheme consists of two algorithms: signing algorithm and verification 
algorithm. Each participant has a secret and a public key. Using the signature 
algorithm, user A can use its secret key to sign a message. Anyone can use A's public 
key and the verification algorithm to verify that the signature was produced by A. 
Without the knowledge of A's secret key it is infeasible to make a signature that 
appears to be made by A. 
2.1.2 Notation 
Binarv concatenation 
Binary concatenation is represented with 11. Given two bit strings A and B, the 
resulting bit string C that is produced by appending BtoA is: C =A 11 
A=JOJO 3=1100 C=A\\B=10101100 
Public key functions 
There are two or more players in a signature scheme. Let them be the signer^, and 
the verifier B. They have a set of keys each containing a secret and a public key. The 
secret key of A is named SKA, and the corresponding public key is PKA. A message M 
signed by party A is written as <M>SKA, and a message M' encrypted by B for A's 
eyes only is written <M'>PKA. 
IF A sends <M>SKA to B, it is assumed that B also receives M, unless otherwise noted 
(this is not true i f B sends <M'>PKA to A). 
It is common practice to sign a digest of a message rather then the whole message, to 
save space. Let HHQ2I hash function. If the texts says that A sends <M>SKA to B, 
then it implies that^ actually sends <H(M)>SKA. 
2.2 Introduction to electronic payment systems 
There has been a lot of research in the area of electronic payments during the last 
twenty years or so. Some of the first research and discoveries in this field was done by 
David Chaum [Ch'82]. 
Electronic payments can be defined in several ways. In general, an electronic payment 
protocol aims at making it convenient, safe and cheap to make payments over a 
network. Damgard , in [Da'88], use a very general, yet fitting definition:" Payment 
systems and credential mechanisms are protocols that allow individuals to conduct a 
wide range of financial and social activities while preventing even infinitely powerful 
and cooperating organizations from monitoring these activities". 
Other definitions have been and will be used by other people. In this thesis I will use a 
very wide definition: any payment made over a computer network will fall into the 
category of electronic payments. This definition includes all types of computer 
networks, but the focus in this thesis will be on Internet payment systems (IPS) [Sh, 
Sw'98]. 
Several electronic payment schemes have been made; some just as theoretical papers, 
some with trail implementations, and some that are actually being used in the market 
today. According to [Milli'95], some of these are: DigiCash, Open Market, 
CyberCash, First Virtual, NetBill. 
2.3 The entities in an electronic payment system 
When we focus on the Internet in specific, we talk about an Internet payment system 
(IPS). Several parties are involved in an IPS, and these will vary depending on the 
scheme. A Delphi survey done by Shon and Swatman in [Sh, Sw'98] showed six 
important players. These were financial institutions, IPS providers, merchants, 
customers, regulators and network providers. 
Different schemes focus on different parties, and most schemes do not consider all of 
these. A trusted third party (TTP) is needed in addition to the six mentioned above, to 
distribute verified public keys. 
Financial institutions. Their main function is to handle the real money transactions. It 
might be a bank that does money transfers between accounts, or a credit card 
company that can bill a cardholder. 
IPS providers. These are the manufacturer and provider of IPS services. They will 
most likely work closely with one or more financial institutions, or they might 
actually be the same entity. 
Several IPS systems use on-line verification of payments. In these cases the IPS might 
work as a clearing server that must approve each payment. 
Vendors. These are the merchants that do business on the Internet. It might be a small 
one-man business, or it might be a large electronic department store. The vendor 
might sell services, electronic goods that can be transferred over the network, or 
physical goods that must be sent by normal mail. 
Customers. These are the general users of the IPS system that will use the scheme to 
pay for merchandise. It might be an individual sitting at home at a PC, or it might be a 
large cooperation. As long as the entity is paying someone it will be identified as a 
user. Customer and user will be used as the same entities in this thesis. 
Regulators. This refers to the legal authority. Their concerns might be the impact of 
the IPS on the financial system, if it allows payments to be tracked, the protection of 
users etc. They might establish an entity that will help settle disputes between parties 
Network providers. These parties supply the actual network facilities, such as 
telecommunication capabilities and other necessities to make the Internet work. 
Trusted Third Partv (TTP). The TTP lets entities look up and verify other entities' 
public keys. 
Broker. Brokers were first introduced in MilliCent [Milli'95], and are mostly used 
with micropayment systems. The broker is a link between users, financial institutions 
and vendors. The broker will produce and/or sell valid money, and/or issue 
certificates to authorise customers as rightful users of the system. Depending on the 
scheme in question, the broker might do other tasks like account handling and 
reimbursement. 
2.3.1 A payments scenario 
A small example of how a payment scheme is provided to give the reader an idea of 
how it can work. The scenario given is not taken from a particular scheme. Details 
about cryptographic techniques have been left out for the sake of simplicity and 
generality. 
Alice has a bank account with Bank One. She wants to withdraw $40 worth of 
electronic money from that account, and contacts Bank One online. Bank One 
provides her with the $40, and deducts that amount from her account. Each piece of 
money has been signed with the bank's digital signature, using the bank's private key. 
Alice can verify this signature by using the bank's public key. This key can be 
provided and verified by a Trusted Third Party. 
Later, Alice finds some music she wants to buy on the site of the music store Tunes. 
She pays them the $5 required to buy the two songs she wants. Tunes controls the 
structure of the money and Bank One's signature to make sure the money is authentic. 
Then they give Alice the passwords to download the music she has bought. 
At some point during the day, Tunes contacts Bank One to get redeemed for the 
payment Alice made. (Any other payments made to Tunes by Bank One customers 
are settled at the same time.) A record of the transaction between Alice and Tunes is 
sent to Bank One, who controls the electronic money. Tunes get their $5, and Bank 
One keeps a record of the payment for future reference. 
2.4 Classifications of payment systems. 
There are several ways to identify and classify payment systems. Ferrira and Dahab 
[Fe, Da'98] have written a paper that focuses on this particular issue. Some of the 
major classifications will be mentioned here. 
2.4.1 On-line or off-line 
Systems that are on-line differ fundamentally from those that are off-line. Normally, it 
is the financial institution's on-line status we are referring to, but it could also be a 
broker, or the IPS provider and its payment server (the entity in question will be 
referred to as a payment authority in this section). 
If the system is on-line, the vendor will contact a payment authority in real time while 
a transaction is being done. The payment authority will check if the payment is valid, 
if the user has tried to spend this money before, if the user has enough funds to make 
the payment and so on. Only after the payment authority has accepted the payment 
will the vendor go through with the transaction. 
In an off-line scheme the contact between the vendor and the payment authority is 
much less frequent. The vendor will normally contact the payment authority at regular 
interval (e.g. once a day) to clear the payments he has received and to get reimbursed 
for them. 
An on-line scheme has the advantage of increased security, as the payment authority 
approves every transaction before it is made. The drawback is that it increases 
communication costs, system costs (systems must be available at all times) transaction 
times etc. The off-line schemes do not need all this, but more complex (and more 
expensive) computations will normally be involved to preserve the required level of 
security. 
2.4.2 Hardware or software based 
Several systems have been proposed that take the advantage of using a piece of 
specialized hardware. This might be a PCMCIA (Personal Computer Memory Card 
International Association) card to a PC, a smart card or other devices. Dedicated 
hardware is often referred to as an electronic wallet. The wallet might consist of 
several parts, and one of these must be tamper resistant to safeguard against backward 
engineering and other attacks. 
An early electronic wallet was proposed by Even and Goldreich in [Ev, Go'83;. 
Further work has been done in several papers by Chaum , Pedersen, Brands and 
others. Some of the most current and detailed work can bee seen in the ESPRIT 
project CAFE [CAFE]. Mondex (www.mondex.com) is an up and running service 
that uses smart cards to store information, and special devices (including phones) to 
make transfers between cards. 
Hardware based systems have several advantages over software based ones. It is 
assumed that the hardware in question is tamper resistant, and thus it is infeasible for 
the user to change the data in it by physically opening the device. This makes it easier 
to control things like double spending, as the device will prevent a user spending the 
same money twice or tampering with the registers that hold the monetary values. 
The main drawback with a hardware based system is increased costs. Every user and 
point of sale (POS) must have one or more pieces of specialised hardware (both the 
wallet and a device to read the data). Also, if the user does not have access to his 
device, then he cannot perform and transaction. 
2.4.3 Value of payments 
The security of the payment system needs to be better when the vale of each payment 
gets increases. Ferreira and Dahab, [Fe, Da'98], defines three broad size groups as 
large, medium to small and micro. Large payments are those of several hundred 
dollars, and such payments will be on-line for many years to come to make fraud very 
difficult. Medium to small payments range from a few dollars up to a few hundred. 
This is the type of payments that most of the research is being focused around. 
Micropayments does not really have a defined lower threshold, but the upper limit is 
normally set to a few dollars. More details of micropayments are given in Chapter 3. 
2.4.4 Payment types 
Two major groups of payments are token based and notational systems, [Fe, Da'98]. 
Token-based systems operate with specific pieces of digital information often referred 
to as tokens or electronic coins. These will often have a set face value, and the user 
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will have to pay the vendor with several coins to get the exact amount due. Token-
based systems are often called cash like systems. 
Most notational payment systems are either cheque based or account based. The user 
will sign an electronic "cheque" or an account transfer authorisation with a digital 
signature, and the vendor will show this to the right payment authority to get 
redeemed. 
We also make a distinction between pre-paid and credit based systems. This is tightly 
linked with the above-mentioned grouping. A pre paid system will normally be token 
based. A user buys tokens from a payment authority, and these tokens will be 
presented to a vendor as payments. Most systems use tokens that can only be showed 
once, but some schemes have proposed tokens that can be used multiple times [Fe'93]. 
A notational system with normally be credit or debit based. 
2.5 Properties of an electronic payment system 
Depending on the scheme and the authors behind it, different properties will be 
considered important. It would be very difficult to make a payment scheme that 
satisfies every possible need, so choices and priorities must be made. The most 
common properties found in systems are listed below. 
• Anonymity. Several systems focus on the protection of the identity of the user. 
The idea is that no entity A in the system should be able to track how another entity B 
spends his or her money. Even a bank should not be able to make a connection 
between a customer and the money that has been issued to that customer. A possible 
exception from this might be regulators, to make it possible to track and stop online 
criminal activity. 
The earliest mechanism for providing anonymity was blind signatures, invented by 
David Chaum [Ch'82]. These signatures allow a financial institution to sign electronic 
money without being able to make a connection between the user and the serial 
numbers on that money. 
Ivan Damgard introduced a system using pseudonyms in [Da'88]. This allowed a 
single user to identify him or her self as different entities to different organizations. A 
TTP is needed to keep track of use different pseudonyms. A similar approach is used 
in the NetBill protocol [Co, Ty, Si'95]. 
• System security. Security is a very wide term, and could be sub divided into 
several different properties like integrity and robustness [Fe, Da'98], privacy, 
confidentiality and non-repudiation. 
This is the most important property of any payment scheme. 
System security makes it intractable for any entity to do anything that entity is not 
authorized to do. No entity should be able to spend more funds than it is allowed to. 
No entity should be able to unlawfully assume a different identity than its own. No 
entity should be able to manipulate another entity's data. It should be possible to 
detect, prevent and punish unauthorized use. 
Encryption and signatures with public keys are two of the major tools for achieving 
this. Symmetric encryption and one-way functions are also used. 
• Cost. The cost of doing a transaction should be low compared to the value of the 
actual transaction. The system must be cheap for a customer to use, but it must also be 
profitable for the IPS provider. 
• Prevent double spending. This goes hand in hand with system security, but it is so 
important that it deserves special mentioning. 
It is very easy to copy electronic data, and thus electronic money. This is a major 
disadvantage electronic money has compared to normal cash, which is considered to 
be intractable to copy. 
Double spending is also tightly linked to anonymity. If the system has perfect 
anonymity, it is difficult and/or expensive to prevent and detect double spending; and 
double spending is easy to handle if there is no anonymity. 
A system was introduced by Chaum, Fiat and Naor in [Ch, Fi, Na'88], which allow 
double spenders to be caught. The user's identity is protected as long as no double 
spending is done. But it is possible for the bank to find the user's identity if the user 
spends the same electronic coin more then once. 
Other ways to prevent double spending are used in different schemes. 
• Divisibility. It must be easy to pay a vendor the exact amount that he asks for. 
This is not a problem in a notational system, but a token based system must have 
mechanisms for dealing with this. 
Chapter 3 
Aspects of micropayments 
3.1 Desired properties for mieropayment systems 
The major differences between properties for macro- and mieropayment systems 
evolve around the value of each individual payment. A lot of work has gone into 
making the systems faster and more efficient, and thus computationally cheaper. A 
long list of different properties required or desired can be composed, and it would be 
favourable to have as many of them in both macro- and mieropayment systems. 
However, some of them need special consideration to make mieropayment systems 
work: 
• Minimization of computational requirements for the system. Since each payment 
is so small, it should not require much use of expensive hardware to make it. This 
goes for both the creation, verification and depositing of the electronic money. One of 
the key methods used is to minimize the use of public key operations. Macropayment 
schemes often use public key signatures to bind a payment to an entity, but this is 
deemed too expensive for micropayments. 
Common techniques are the use of efficient one-way hashing schemes and private key 
cryptography. 
• Minimization of the communication costs. Communications between the parties 
involved costs both time and money. See Section 3.4 on on-line vs. off-line payments 
for details. 
• Certified delivery. This is a guarantee for both parties involved in a transaction to 
ensure they both will get what they want. For the customer this means that he or she 
will have to pay if and only if the goods are delivered. For vendors it means that the 
customer will only get the goods if the payment is made. This is possible with 
micropayments, since the goods often will be delivered over the same network as the 
payments. 
• Micromerchants support. Micromerchant is a name used for entities selling only 
small amounts of electronic goods. They will most likely be individuals without a 
large support system, but who have goods that people are willing to pay for. Examples 
might be freelance reporters or artists. 
• Handling streaming. Micropayments can be used to pay for media and other 
services where a payment is good for a time period. This can for example be 
telephone calls or pay per view movies. The payment system must handle streaming 
of media and other time dependant service like these. 
3.1.1 Other properties wanted in both macro- and micropayment schemes: 
• Offer strong security for all parties. 
• Minimize the need for special hardware. 
• Minimize fraud in the system. Special consideration should be given to double 
spending. 
• All parties must be able to authenticate themselves as valid entities to other parties 
they are dealing with. 
• Fairness. 
• Provide users with anonymity, privacy and untraceability. 
• Scalability. There should not be any bottlenecks in the system. 
• It should be easy to pay any arbitrary value in a transaction. 
• Transferability. It should be possible for several parties to make payments with 
the same piece of electronic money before cashing it with a financial institution 
• Interoperability. The system should support multiple currencies. It should also be 
possible to deposit a piece of electronic money with another financial institution than 
the one that originally made or issued it. 
• Non-repudiation. An entity should not be able to go back on a deal that has been 
agreed upon through the participation in a transaction. 
3.2 Setting for micropayment schemes 
The entities in a micropayment scheme are mostly the same as in a macropayment 
system. However, there are a few differences, and some of the entities can perform 
different tasks. The main difference probably is the broker. 
3.2.1 The broker 
The broker was introduced in the Millicent scheme presented in [Milli'95], and is used 
in many other papers since. It acts as a link between the customers, vendors and 
financial institutions, and can handle the customers' and vendors' accounts. 
The broker will sell or issue electronic money to customers, and will redeem vendors 
when they contact the broker to return the money. Another option is to let the broker 
certify the customers to produce electronic money for themselves. This saves 
communication cost between brokers and customers, and computation costs for the 
broker. By letting customers create their own payments we move towards a more 
distributed system, and the chances of bottlenecks become fewer. 
If the broker creates the payments, then these will be sold in bulk to the customers. 
The customer will pay the broker through a macropayment system or with a credit 
card. If the customer pays the broker with an anonymous macropayment system, then 
the micropayment system in question can qualify for anonymity. 
If the customer creates the payments, then the system cannot be anonymous. The 
customer will pay the vendor, and the vendor will accept the payments because the 
customer has a certificate from a trusted broker. To receive redemption, the vendor 
sends this broker the money received from the customer. The broker checks the 
payments, and if they are valid the vendor is paid and the customer is billed for the 
purchase. 
A third option is that the vendors produce the payments. This can be done in certain 
systems where the payments are vendor specific, and was proposed in the Millicent 
system [Milli'95]. The brokers will buy the payments from the vendors in large bulk 
to get a good price, and sell them is smaller quantities to customers for a higher price. 
The benefit of this system is that the vendor does not need to contact the broker for 
redemption. But the downside is that the vendors need large hardware capacity to 
produce the payments. The communication during the bulk purchases will be 
relatively intensive, but no extra communication is produced. The payments will have 
to go from the vendor to the broker either way, be it before or after the customer has 
spent them. 
3.3 Anonymity 
In electronic payment systems anonymity refer to the property of protecting the actual 
identity of the entities in the system. The main focus is to protect the identity of the 
customers. 
There are several motivations to protect the customers' anonymity, but they all evolve 
around the ability to hide the customers' spending patterns. If these are not hidden, 
data can be collected and profiles can be made to match each individual user's habits 
in the digital environment. This can easily lead to what is called intrusive profiling 
[Br'99]. The most obvious aspect of intrusive profiling is directed advertising, where 
the user is 'bombarded' with ads and offers that have been custom made to his or her 
interests and shopping routines. But more serious consequences like discrimination 
and political assault are also quite likely 
But it is not enough to protect the identity of each individual. We also need to make it 
difficult to see of two payments have been made by the same entity or not. This 
property is called unlinkability, and is tightly bound to anonymity. 
Strong anonymity can be a problem in macropayment systems due to the potential of 
criminal use. Authorities are not interested in creating new payment systems that are 
attractive to criminals. If the anonymity is too strong, it will be impossible to trace 
illegal transactions to either of the parties involved. This can be used for blackmail, 
money laundering and other unlawful actions. 
Criminal usage is much less of a problem with micropayment systems, as the values 
are so low. After all, it will be somewhat difficult making much money with illegal 
use of payments worth only a few cents each. This would lead one to think that 
micropayment systems could have stronger, and perhaps absolute, anonymity 
implemented. However, there are technical problems doing this: 
As was mentioned in Chapter 2, one of the main ways of achieving anonymity is 
using one-show blind signatures, first introduced in [Ch, Fi, Na'88]: These are a 
special type of public key signatures that lets the signer sign a blinded message. Thus, 
a customer can get a signature of the bank on electronic money, and the bank will not 
be able to link that money (through its serial number) to that particular customer. This 
scheme can work well for macropayments, but becomes too expensive for 
micropayments. In general, the number of public key operations should be minimized 
in a micropayment system, and one public key signature on each payment seems to be 
too computationally expensive. 
3.3.1 Properties of anonymous schemes 
If a payment scheme is anonymous, it is infeasible to make the connection between a 
user and a payment that have been made. That is, it should not be possible to find out 
who was the paying party in a given transaction. 
A consequence of anonymity is that the payment system must be pre-paid. If it is not 
pre paid, then the customer must be sent a bill after the electronic money has been 
spent. To do this, the bank must be able to make a connection between money spent 
and the user that spent them. 
3.3.2 Batch signatures 
An option to validate electronic payments is to use batch signatures. This way, one 
public key signature can be used to authenticate several payments, and the 
computational cost can be spread out amongst them. 
This method is used with several proposed systems based on chain and tree structures. 
The names of some of there schemes (and the papers they are described in) are 
PayWord[Ri, Sh'96], NetCard [An, Ma, Su'97], Pedersen's proposal [Pe'96], ^iKP[Ha, 
St, Wa'96] and PayTree [Ju, Yu'96]. A series of payments are made from a single tree 
or chain, and the root of the tree or chain is authenticated through a signature. Each 
payment can be linked back to the signed root, and thus be verified as authentic. 
A problem with batch signatures is the innate linkability between each single 
payment. An aspect of the anonymity property is that it should not be possible to 
identify two payments as coming form the same entity. This property is naturally 
violated if each payment is verified by linking it back to another payment. However, 
this can be acceptable for some payments, and can thus be used in certain 
micropayment systems. Examples are phone calls or pay per view movies, where 
several payments are made to pay for the same product (e.g. a payment every minute 
for the duration of the movie). We still want to protect the customer's anonymity, but 
it is acceptable that the vendor knows that each payment comes form the same 
customer. 
Another problem with batch signatures is how to handle partially spent batches. Since 
anonymous schemes must be pre-paid, the money in a signed batch has already been 
debited from the customer's account. Then the question arises what to do about the 
money that is left in a partially used batch. Theoretically the vendor can give back 
change, but this will violate the customer's anonymity. Another way to handle this is 
by the bank refunding the customer at a later time, but this involves a fairly long 
delay. 
3.3.3 Pseudonyms 
A non-cryptographic technique used to protect the anonymity of the customers is to 
let them use pseudonyms instead of their real identity. This can be done in different 
ways, but it will normally involve some type of anonymity server. 
A user can register with an organization, and this will issue a public/private key pair, 
not giving away the anonymity of the user. When the user deals with a vendor, 
remailers and other services can be used to deliver the electronic goods to the 
customer without revealing the identity. A problem with this type of anonymity is that 
the financial institutions in the system might be unwilling to let anonymous customers 
establish accounts. This can also interfere with tax laws and other regulations. 
The payment service provider might also offer pseudonyms. This way, the customers 
can identify themselves with different names to different vendors, and their spending 
patterns will thus be hard to map. Banks can offer similar services, and some of the 
above-mentioned problems can be avoided. 
Using pseudonyms, every payment can be traced back to an identity. The security lies 
in the infeasibility of linking that identity to an actual customer. However, if this can 
be done once, than all other payments done by that customer using that pseudonym 
can also be traced. This is a general problem with systems using pseudonyms. 
Allowing customers to use several pseudonyms helps, but the linkability between 
payments is still a problem. 
Another problem with pseudonyms is that the anonymity is protected by trust rather 
than the computational infeasibility of revealing the customer's identity. This can 
prove to be a problem, but it can also fit nicely into the existing trust model. For 
example, we already assume there exists a trusted party to issue public/private key 
pairs. 
3.4 On-line and off-line systems 
Some macropayment systems use on-line verification of payments to strengthen the 
security of the transactions. This is a useful technique to prevent fraud like double 
spending and counterfeit money, but comes at a cost; namely the communication 
overhead required. The vendor will contact the bank to make sure a payment is 
authentic and in order before the transaction with the customer is executed. 
This type of on-line verification (also called on-line payment) is considered to be too 
expensive for micropayment schemes. However, several micropayment systems 
propose to use of communications with the bank on other occasions than for 
withdrawal and deposit. This will be discussed Section 3.5 about probabilistic 
payments. 
There are several drawbacks with on-line verification, besides the fact that it produces 
time-delays due to communications. The overall cost of the systems also increases, as 
does the chance for bottlenecks to occur. 
If a vendor is to contact a payment authority for every payment, then that authority 
must be on-line at all times. The cost for being able to handle high traffic even at peak 
times will be considerable for the payment authority and thus for the system as a 
whole. This might be bearable for a macropayment system, but may be too expensive 
for a micropayment scheme. However, there are the cases where a payment system is 
hybrid, handling both macro- and micropayments. The cost of the on-line system will 
be spread out over a larger user and payment group, and this might make the system 
economically feasible. 
Related to the financial cost of the on-line system is the number of available on-line 
payment authority servers. These servers can easily form bottlenecks in the system, 
making delays too long. A network of servers is needed to handle the load, pushing 
the price up further. 
3.5 Probabilistic payment systems 
Some of the problems with micropayments have tried to be addressed by adding the 
property of chance to the system. 
3.5.1 On-line verification 
As mentioned, on-line verification of payments is considered too expensive for 
micropayment systems. But what happens if only a few of the payments are verified 
on-line and the rest are verified in batches at a later time (i.e. off-line verification). 
The main reason for using on-line verification is to prevent double spending by users, 
and also to make sure a customer does not overspend. 
A vendor can accept most payments off-line to save communication costs and time 
delays. However a small number of the payments picked at random will be checked 
on-line before the transaction is completed. This will allow a few illegal payments to 
be stopped before they are made, but more importantly it will discourage customers 
from making fraudulent payments. If a user knows there is a chance of being caught, 
this might stop him or her from cheating. 
The probability for doing an on-line check should be proportional with the value of 
the payment made. The greater the value, the bigger the chance that the payment will 
be checked. This ensures that cheating becomes increasingly harder and more risky as 
the intended fraud gets bigger. 
However, it is not only cheating and fraud that can be controlled with probabilistic 
on-line verification. It is also possible to monitor and to a certain degree control the 
customers credit limit. 
When a customer makes a payment to a vendor, this payment is checked on-line no 
matter what. The bank will then know that the given customer is active with the 
vendor, and will keep an eye on the credit limit of the customer. Whenever the vendor 
sends a new payment for verification, the customer's usage is updated at the bank. If 
the customer spends more then his or her limit, or shows signs of doing so, the bank 
can contact all vendors dealing with that customer to stop all transactions. This 
effectively stops the customer fi-om overspending any further. 
The cost of such a system grows with the values of the transactions done. If the 
scheme is used with relatively high valued payment, then the cost will get closer to 
that of an on-line payment system. If all or most transactions stay small, then the 
system will be closer to the cost of an off-line payment system: The vendor in every 
payment systems needs to contact the bank at least once to deposit the electronic 
money received from customers. With probabilistic verification the vendor will have 
to contact the bank at least once per customer it deals with in addition to the 
communication needed for deposit. 
3.5.2 Probability of payments 
A technique for cutting down on both communication- and computational costs is to 
not pay every vendor every time a service is bought. It sounds a bit odd, but we can 
add a probabilistic chance to see if a vendor will be paid or not. It can be seen as using 
a specialized type of lottery tickets rather than electronic money as payments. 
The idea is that it costs less to pay a few vendors than paying many. The few vendors 
that gets paid will be paid a lot more than what a normal micropayment is worth, and 
the law of large numbers will make sure the values evens out. 
Normally, if a given vendors deals with a thousand customers in a day, it will receive 
several payments from each of them and several thousand payments must be 
processed. With this type of probability added only a handful of customers will 
actually make a payment to the vendor in question. Both the communication costs for 
deposit, and the bank's computational costs for checking the payments can thus be 
greatly reduced. 
There are several ways of achieving this type of probabilistic payments. The customer 
can issue a 'payment' where the chance for getting paid is described. This chance can 
be based on a number of things, and the question if an actual payment will be made or 
not can be resolved instantaneous or there might be a delay. 
For delayed decisions on who will and who will not get paid, an external source can 
be used. Examples mentioned can be numbers form the state lottery. 
Protocols that settled the question of payment in real time can make use of the 
knowledge of the pre-images of one-way hash functions. The customer will choose 
random winning numbers, and commit to these with a 'payment'. The vendor will 
generate random numbers, trying to match the numbers of the customer. If the vendor 
guess right it gets paid, otherwise the vendor provides the service for free. 
In an example described in [Ri'97], the vendor generates a random 30-digit decimal 
number w, and send the customer the hash value 0-C(w) . The customer will send a 
'payment' committing to ^ w j a n d a winning condition. The winning condition is that 
the last three digits of w must match a random number generated by the customer. The 
vendor can easily check if it wins, and will send w to the customer if it does win. 
Several problems arise with these types of probabilistic payments. One is that users of 
the system might not feel comfortable with the uncertainty of payment. The vendors 
never know exactly when and how much they will get paid, and the customers does 
not know exactly how much they spend. Even though this will even out, many people 
might object to the idea. 
Another problem mentioned is that a system like this can conflict with the regulations 
for lotteries. Even this is not a lottery authorities might see it differently. Also, since 
lottery laws vary in individual countries, a probabilistic payment system will have to 
be evaluated but local authorities. There is a danger that an otherwise good payment 
system will not be accepted in a series of countries, and this will weaken the overall 
acceptability and usefulness of the payment system. 
3.6 Money production 
Both macro- and micropayment systems have different types of money. They can be 
divided into two main groups, namely token based and notational. 
In token-based systems the electronic money is represented by specific digital patterns 
with predetermined values. Tokens are similar to conventional coins and notes, and 
several tokens might have to be used to pay a particular amount. Token-based systems 
are often called cash like, and the tokens are often referred to as coins. 
Several parties in the system can do the actual production of electronic money. An 
issuing authority like a bank or a broker will often do it, but the customers can also do 
it. Either way the vendor receiving the money must be able to verify the authenticity 
of the payments. 
3.6.1 Hash chains 
Repeated hashing of a number is a much-used technique to produce the payments. 
Each link in the hash chain will be a separate payment often referred to as a tick, a 
coupon or a payword. 
Some of the payment systems (and the papers describing them) using hash chains are 
PayWord (in [Ri, Sh'96]), NetCard (in [An, Ma, Su'97]), Pedersen's proposal (in 
[Pe'96]) and i^iKP (in [Ha, St, Wa'96]). 
A hash chain is formed by repeatedly applying a one-way hash function on a 
randomly generated number. Each link w/ in the chain is the hash value of the next 
link Wi+i. 
To make a chain of length «+7, a random number must be generated. This will be 
the last link in the chain. 
Let HhQ a strong one-way hash function. The hash chain can then be generated in the 
following manner: 
Wi= H(wi+i) 
Wo is called the root of the chain. 
A chain like this has the nice property that, if w/ is made public, only the person who 
generated the chain will know the value of Any other entity must break the one-
way function be able to find 
3.6.2 Hash collisions 
Let HhQ a strong one-way hash function. It is easy to find = H(x), given x and K It 
is considered infeasible to find x given y and ^ and it is also infeasible to find two 
values xi and X2 so that H(xi)= H(x2) and xi X2. The first problem is called reversing 
the hash function, while the later is called finding a collision. However, given enough 
time and computing power both of these tasks can be done. 
In Micromint, [Ri, Sh'96], a system was presented where a broker with specialized 
hardware can produce special electronic coins that consist of a k-way hash collision. 
That is, a series of numbers xi, X2, ...,Xk are found such that 
!Hlx])= J{(x2)= = The verification of such a coin is easy for anyone to do 
given the numbers and the hash function K but it is infeasible to produce counterfeit 
coins. 
3.6.3 Scrip 
The Millicent protocol, [Milli'95], presents a token based system, introducing scrip. 
Scrip represents an account that a customer has with a given vendor. This way, the 
money is both vendor and customer specific. A piece of scrip contains several data 
items, including the identity of the vendor and customer and the monetary value of the 
scrip. A secret key is adde to the scrip and a hash value produced, giving a certificate 
in the form of a MAC. 
3.7 Fraud and loss of money 
Some micropayment schemes are not as concerned about absolute security against 
loss or fraud as other payment systems with higher values per payment [Milli'95], [Ri, 
Sh'96], [Mu, Va, Li'97]. Micropayments can be seen as pocket change, and it is no big 
deal if a few micropayments get lost now and then. Likewise, a few occurrences of 
fraud are accepted, but it must be possible to detect and stop large-scale frauds. 
It is simply too expensive to have the necessary mechanisms to make sure every 
single micropayment is protected and accounted for at every step of the protocol It is 
enough to make fraud hard and detectable, [St, Va'97]. 
3.7.1 Fraud detection/prevention 
The main device for preventing loss in the system is by secure production of the 
electronic money. Some of these are described in Section 3.6. 
The NetBill system [Si, Ty95] uses digital signatures for the transaction, which of 
course is a very effective weapon against fraud. However, as mentioned earlier, 
digital signatures are considered to be too computationally expensive for 
micropayments. 
The market forces are considered to have a large influence in many papers. It is often 
assumed that customers and the market in general will shun vendors that cheat, 
forcing them out of business. Some of the papers discussing this are SVP in [St, 
Va'97], MicroPayments based on iKP in [Ha, St, Wa'96], Micro-Payments via 
Efficient Coin-Flipping in [Li, Os'97] and PayWord in [Ri, Sh'96]. 
If the payment scheme is not anonymous, then the chance of fraud goes down. A 
person is less likely to cheat if his or her identity is known to the parties he or she is 
cheating. The problem of fraud then becomes tightly linked to the authentication of 
the entities in the system, and whether or not a person can manage to get a fake 
identity and thus avoid paying their debts. 
Overspending is an issue that may or may not be actual fraud, depending on the 
system. In a credit based system, an over spender who pays his or her bills has only 
committed a minor offence against the financial institution in question, and might 
have to pay an additional fee. If the system is pre paid, overspending will most likely 
be considered fraud, as the person is spending funds he or she should not have access 
to. 
Some of the most effective methods to prevent fraud and overspending are on-line 
verification, one-show blind signatures and tamper resistant hardware devices. 
3.8 Authentication 
In a computer environment where all entities have public/private key pairs, we can 
use the public key to identify individual, for example through X.509 certificates [Cho, 
Na, Pu, Un'98]. 
Macropayment systems often rely on public key signatures to authenticate users, as 
does some micropayment systems. However, several micropayment systems do not 
use public key signatures at all, to save costs, and need other ways to identify users of 
the system. 
If public key signatures are used, then this will normally just be used for one payment, 
or a commitment for the payments to come. Micropayment systems don't use a public 
key signature on each individual payment, so all systems need other measures to 
identify separate payments. 
3.9 Protecting the customers rights 
Customers want to be sure they get what they pay for, and vendors wants to be sure 
they get paid. This property is easy to fulfil with conventional purchases, as the 
customer and vendor are in the same room, exchanging goods for money. 
It is difficult, and often impossible to get this property working in macropayment 
systems, as goods often are physical. If they are, then the vendor will ship the ordered 
goods after the payment is cleared, and the customer will have to wait and hope that 
he or she receives the merchandise. Macropayment systems must have a mechanism 
for receipts, since there are room for both fraud by the vendor and difficulties during 
shipments. Receipts can be handled quite easily with a public key signature on a 
message containing the purchase details. 
Again we run into the problem with public key cryptography and micropayments. It 
will be too expensive to issue a receipt for each micropayment if a public key 
signature is needed on each receipt. Receipts are also hard to handle if we want to 
preserve anonymity in a payment system. After all, the vendor will have to make the 
receipt out to someone, and that is hard to do if the customer is anonymous. It can be 
done through pseudonym schemes, but can easily be complicated. 
Another problem with receipt is that they are only good for proving that a payment 
was done for a given product or service. A customer that did not receive what he or 
she paid for will have a hard time proving this to an arbiter or even the vendor to 
whom the payment was made. 
Quite often, it will not be practical to use receipts in a micropayment system. This is 
especially true for streamed products like movies and phone calls. In such cases it will 
be more practical to use one receipt for the whole product, not for each payment. 
Most proposed micropayment system does not have mechanisms for receipts or 
similar safe guards. They assume that vendors that do not deliver will be shunned and 
go out of business. An option is to have the brokers or banks, or a central authority 
handle complaint about bad deliveries. If a vendor gets enough complaints, it might 
be forced out of business by revoking its certificates or through other means. 
3.9.1 Certified delivery 
A system for certified delivery was presented in the NetBill system, [Si, Ty'95]. This 
ensures that the payment only goes through if the customer gets the information he or 
she paid for. NetBill is an on-line system, and any payment system that wants to use 
this type of certified delivery needs to be on-line as well. 
With NetBill's certified delivery, the vendor encrypts the information goods before it 
is sent to customer. The customer sends the payment to the vendor, and the vendor 
sends both the decryption key and the payment to the NetBill server. If the payment is 
approved, the NetBill server keeps a copy of the key, and instructs the vendor to give 
the key to the customer. If a problem arises with the decryption, then the customer can 
go directly to the NetBill server to get the key. 
Chapter 4 
One-time signature schemes with an infinite 
authentication tree 
Merkle [Me'87], [Me'89] proposed a scheme where one-time signatures are used in 
conjunction with an authentication tree. The one-time signature is based on a system 
proposed by Lamport and Diffie, and improved by Wintemitz and Merkle [Me'87], 
[Me'89]. 
The following description is a summary taken mainly from [Me'87], and some from 
[Me'89]. The reader is referred to [Me'87], [Me'89] and Menezes et al [Me, Oo, 
Va'97] for more detailed descriptions. Ove Heigre has written about the Merkle-, 
Wintemitz and other one-time signature schemes in his thesis, [He'OO;. 
4.1 The Lamport-Diffie one-time signature 
The Lamport-Diffie one-time signature uses one-way functions as the base for their 
one-time signatures. The signature is first described in [Di, He76], and later 
referenced to in [Me'87] as the "Lamport-Diffie one-time signature". 
If a signer wants to sign a one-bit message m={0,l}, this can be done in the following 
way: The signer selects two values xj andjc^, and computQS yj=!H(xi) dxvdy2=0i(x2), 
where ^ i s a one-way hash function, yi is made public. The message m is signed with 
x; if m = 7, and with X2\im = 0. The verifier can easily check the signature by 
computing 0-C(Xi) =yi. 
If many Xi and yi are made, a longer message can be signed. To sign an n bit message, 
2n XiS and 2n yts must be made. The 2n yis must be public, or the receiver must 
previously have received them from the signer in an authenticated manner. The 2n XiS 
are used to sign the message. 
4.2 Merkle*s one-time signatures 
Merkle improved the Lamport-Diffie scheme by cutting down the size of the 
signature. Rather than creating 2n XiS (and 2n only n+log2n needs to be made. 
This almost halves the size of the signature. 
Instead of making two x's and two for each bit, only one is made per bit. Let the 
message be M=mi m2 ...nin, mi={0,l}. If m/=7, thenXi is released, and if then x/ 
is not released. 
This would enable the receiver to cheat, by pretending not to receive certain x'5. 
To avoid cheating, a check sum must be added to M, where the number of O's'mM is 
noted. The message to sign i sM ' = M \ \ C , where 11 is concatenation and Cis the binary 
representation of the number of O's in M. 
Let's say M i s an 8 bit message. The length of the check sum C will be log28 = 3, so 
the length of the message to be signed, M\ is 8+3=11. 
To sign a message of length 11, Alice will need a vector X == x;, X2, xy; and the 
corresponding vector Y. 7 must be known to the verifier Bob. 
Let M = "1001 1101The number of is 3, which is " 11" in binary. Thus C = 
"01 r\ andM' = "10011101 Oil". 
Alice sends the message M' along with xj, X4, X5, xe, xg, xjo and xjj to Bob. Bob cannot 
modify M - M | |C if he wants to have a valid signature on M'. He cannot change a 0 in 
M into a 1, since he cannot create any XiS that he has not received from Alice. He can 
change a 1 in M into a 0, but that is going to make the count C wrong. He would have 
to change C too, but again he cannot produce the needed x/. 
Example 4.2.1 
Alice wants to send the 8 bit message M to Bob: 
M= 1001 0101 
The number of O's in M is 4, which is 100 in binary. This is the check sum for M. 
C= 100 
Append C to M to produce M' 
M' = M\\C = 1001 0101 100 
Alice must produce Xand 7, with length 11 (8 for M and 3 for Q . 
X= X], X2, X]] 
Y = yi,y2, ..-^yii 
7 is made public, so Bob can verify that Ahce produced it. 
The signature on M' is 
Xj, X4, X6, Xs, Xg 
Alice sends the message M' along with the signature to Bob. Bob cannot modify 
M | C if he wants to have a valid signature on M'. 
He cannot change a 0 in M into a 1, since he cannot create any XiS that he has not 
received from Alice. 
If he tried to modify M to 1001 1101, then he will needxj to produce a valid 
signature. 
Bob can change a 1 in M into a 0, but that is going to make the count in C wrong. He 
would have to change C too, but again he cannot produce the needed xu 
He can modify M to 1001 0001, since he can pretend he did not receive X6. However, 
this would change C from 100 to 011. Bob would need to produce xio and Xn to make 
a valid signature on M'. 
4.3 Winternitz*s one-time signatures 
Wintemitz proposed a variant to Merkle's signature that reduces the signature size, but 
it requires more computations [Me'87]. 
The idea is to reduce the number of x and j values needed to sign a message. Rather 
than mdkmgy=9{(x), Tfis applied repeatedly to Repeated applications of HWiW 
have this notation: H(7{(7{(9{(x)))) is written as !H^(x), H(H(H(x))) is written as 
etc., and thus :}f(x) is equal to x. 
This way, a single ;c and;; value can be used to sign several bits. Let M=m/, be a 2 
bit message and n=4 be the message space (4 possible messages with a 2 bit 
message). The public y is equal to !H^(x); y= !H^(x). The signature on M is ^{^(x) and 
TT'^^ix). The signature can be verified be applying repeated hash functions to reach;;. 
The Wintemitz scheme can be used to sign longer messages as well. To do this, the 
message is split into t sub elements of equal length k, and each of these elements will 
be signed with an a: and pair. 
M=mi\\m2\\...\\mt 
A checksum C must be added to the message in a similar fashion as in Merkle's 
scheme (Section 4.2). The checksum is the sum of each sub elements minus n. 
C = - m , ) <12" [Me, Oo, Va'97] /=i 
Example 4.3.1 
Alice wants to sign an 8 bit message M. 
M=mi 1712 ^ ¿ ^ Om (9 and 5 in decimal) 
mi 1712 
Alice will use one jc and pair to sign four bits, making 
k=4 
and 
C = (n-mi) + (n-m2) = (16-9) + (16-5) = 18 
C = cic2 = 00^00j^ 
C] C2 
The message w to sign is then 
w=M\\C = mi\\m2\\ ci || 
mi m2 C; C2 
The signature S consists of four hash values as follows 
^ = H-'^fxJ = H'(xJ H'(x,) H'(x,) H'(x,) 
Given the public Y 
Y = yxyiy^yA ^ ^"(xj ^""(x,) H "(X,) ^^(xj 
Signature S can easily be verified by checking each Sj: 
4.4 Merkle^s authentication tree 
A problem with one-time signatures is that each signature requires a new entry in a 
public record. This amounts to a large exchange of information that might be work if 
only two parties are involved, but it becomes unwieldy as a general signature scheme. 
Merkle proposed a scheme where one-time signatures form a tree structure. The root 
of the tree is entered into a public record, held by a TTP. Each node in the tree is used 
to sign a message, but also to verify the authenticity of its children. 
When a one-time signature is used, it must be authenticated. This is done by 
recursively showing the ancestors of the node to the verifier, all the way up to the 
root. 
Each signature still has a private array x, and a public array;; which is a function ofx. 
A binary tree is used as an example for simplicity, but in theory any K-array tree can 
be used. 
Each node in the tree has three functions: 
1) sign off the left child, 
2) sign off the right child and 
3) sign off a message. 
Thus, each node contains three separate signatures. 
Two three-dimensional arrays, x and> ,̂ are needed to form the tree. The three fields in 
each index of the arrays are: 
x[<node number>,<left, right or message>,<index within the one-time signature>]. 
<node number> is simply the node's index within the tree structure. <left, right or 
message> indicates if this signature is used to sign off the left child, the right child or 
a message. <index within the one-time signature> is the index of the bit this particular 
;c-values is going to sign. 
Assumepx's are needed to make a child signature and qx's needed to make a 
message signature. The private part of the signature in node i would then look like 
this: 
x[i, left, 1], x[i, left, 2], ...., x[i, left, p] 
x[i, right,l], x[i, right, 2], ...., x[i, right, p] 
x[i, message,!], x[i, message, 2], .,.., x[i, message, q] [4.1] 
Let x[i, message, *J be all needed to sign a message (and the same for left and 
right children) using the signature in node i. Let also xfi, *J be all jc'i- for both left, 
right and the message in node i. 
The public part i has exactly the same structure. 
The public part;; of the root must be authenticated by a TTP, much like a public 
signature. To sign a message m, the signer uses the one-time signature described 
above, with the secret parameters xfi, message, */. All public parameters _y/y, 
message, *7 are given to the verifier. Then certain x's in x[i, message, */ are shown to 
the verifier as well, who can now see that the signature is indeed made by the right 
person. 
The verifier must then make sure>'//, message, are actually a valid set of 
parameters. This can be done with the parameters y[j, left or right, *], where j is the 
index of parent node to node i (j=li/2 J. Verification for can be done 
recursively up to the root, which in turn has been authenticated by a TTP. The signer 
must keep sending the parent n o d e s l e f t or right, 0<=k<j\ and some other 
information to the verifier until the root is reached. This is often referred to as the 
authentication path. 
If we use Merkle's signature scheme (see Section 4.2), QSLch y[r,s,tj {r,s and t are the 
indexes as indicated in [4.1]) is computed from the corresponding x/'v,)^: 
y[iJ,k]=H(x[ij,k]) 
Each node / has a unique identifying number called HASH(i), which is a collection of 
all the public parameters for node i. 
HASH(i) = Hmy[i, left, *]) 11 H(y[i, right, *]) 11 H(y[i, message, *])) 
Chapter 5 
New improvements for micropayment schemes 
based on hash chains 
5.1 Introduction to the scheme 
A payment scheme based on hash chains is presented in this chapter. These are 
suggestions for new extensions and improvements to existing micropayment systems 
based on hash chains. 
The payments are structured in a Merkle authentication tree, and any one-time 
signature scheme can be used, although Merkle's and Wintemitz's schemes have been 
the main focus during this research. 
The new improvements offer more flexibihty and opens up for time saving for both 
payment and verifications of already executed transactions. These properties are 
discussed in Section 5.5. 
5.2 Related work 
5.2.1 Hash chains 
Diffie and Helman used repeated one-way functions in a password authentication 
scheme, [Di, He'76], and Wintemitz used repeated hash functions to design the one-
time signature scheme described in Section 3.3. [Me'87]. 
Several micropayment schemes use hash chains to make payments. The idea is that a 
chain is created be applying repeated hash functions, and the security is based on the 
difficulty of reversing a cryptographic hash function. Some of the first to use hash 
chains for payment systems were Rivest and Shamir in their PayWord system, 
[Ri,Sh'96], Anderson, Manifavas and Sutherland in the NetCard scheme, [An, Ma, 
Su'97], and Pedersen's proposal in [Pe'96]. 
A short description of PayWord is provided here to illustrate how a hash chain can be 
used for micropayments. 
5.2.2 A short summary of PayWord 
Let J-ChQ a secure one-way hash function. 
n is the length of the hash chain that will be made. 
The user selects a random number 
A chain of values is then produced in the following manner: 
The user ends up with a chain 
So> Sj, Sn-h S„ 
where 
So = H(Si), Si = 3<(S2), ,Sn.l = H(Sr), S„ 
Each link 5, in the chain is a payment token, so is considered the root of the chain, and 
the user must authenticate the root so the vendor knows he will get paid for tokens 
related to so- The user authenticates So by signing a certificate issued by a broker or 
bank. 
Each payment consists of the next token from the chain, and the token's index thus 
the payment is (5,, i). The vendor have received the previous token 5,./ before, and can 
thus verify this payment by checking that Si.i = !H(si) (unless i=0, in which case it is 
the root which is signed with a pubHc signature). 
5.3 The new payment scheme 
The system is built around an authentication tree with one-time signatures that is 
reduced to a chain structure. Each node in the tree will contain signatures to 
authenticate its child, and a hash chain will be attached to the node. The hash chain 
will be authenticated through the one-time signatures. 
5.3.1 Using a chain rather than a tree structure 
An authentication tree can be arbitrarily large (or small), and only the root needs to be 
created initially; any other node can be made later on. The user will create a new tree 
for every vendor he does business with. Making a new tree is not more computation 
ally expensive the making a node in an exciting tree. Thus making a new tree for each 
vendor does not produce any extra work. 
Normally a tree structure is used in order to need as few recursive calls as possible to 
get up to the root to authenticate a signature. This makes each signature cheap, since 
only log n signature authentications are needed, where n is the tree depth of the 
signature to authenticate. But we can shorten the authentication path to only one step 
here, since a new tree is made for each vendor. A child can be authenticated by its 
parent, and the parent has already been authenticated by the vendor in question. 
Therefore, a chain will be used rather than a tree. This saves space, since each node 
only have to contain two signatures; one for the child and one for the message, rather 
than one signature for each of its k children plus one for the message. An 
authentication tree reduced to a chain will be referred to as a signature chain. 
The message signature in a node i can be used to authenticate a hash chain and the 
monetary value pf each link in that chain like this: 
Hash chain authentication = <so,o, i, value>Message signaturei 
Where so,o is the root of the hash chain, i is the node depth and value is the value of 
each link in the chain. 
5.3.2 Further size improvement on the signature nodes 
A node in an authentication tree (or a signature chain) normally contains signatures to 
authenticate its children or child, and also a signature to authenticate a message. With 
this structure, the identification of node i is based on the public values of all the 
signatures (that is, all the y matricis). With a signature chain, each node will need two 
signatures, and the node identification HASH(i) is: 
HASH(i) = !H'(!Hly[i, child, V) || H(y[i, message^])) 
The idea behind this is to make sure an attacker or fraudulent user cannot insert false 
signature node, since each node is identified with public values that in turn is 
authenticated with a signature of a parent. 
However, rather than using a message signature to sign the root of a hash chain, we 
can use the root to as an integral part of the node identification. This is done by 
including the hash chain root in the identic fiction HASH(i). The value of each link in 
the hash chain must also be included, since we no longer have a message signature to 
authenticate the value. 
Each node will always be associated with only one hash chain with one value, and this 
connection does not need to be made until a payment from that hash chain is needed. 
Therefore, we don not lose any flexibility by dropping the message signature from the 
signature node. The new identification for a signature node will now be: 
HASH(i) = H(H(y[i, child, *7; 11 Hash Chain Root \ \ Value per link) 
All three components are public values just like in the original Merkle tree. None of 
these values can be replaced by a fraudulent user, since the vendor will detect this 
when computing HASH(i). The vendor cannot replace any of these values either, since 
the bank will detect this. Therefore, we do not compromise security with this new 
structure. 
We have now gone from 2 to just 1 Wintemitz signatures per node, so the size of each 
signature node is reduced to almost half (on top of the reduction achieved by going 
from a tree to a chain structure as described in Section 5.3.1). 
5.3.3 Assumptions 
The scheme is credit based. A discussion about adding hardware to allow for a pre 
paid version is provided later. 
The bank is off-line. 
Multiple currencies are supported. 
Divisibility is not a problem since denominations are chosen on demand. 
No anonymity is provided, unless some kind of anonymity server is used. Again, 
hardware can help solve this. 
Three parties are involved: user U, bank B and vendor V. The user has an account 
with the bank. It might be useful to have a broker that acts as an intermediary between 
users, vendors and banks, but it does not make a difference for the principle of the 
scheme. 
Í/establishes an account with B, and B issues U with a certificate. It might look 
something like this: 
Certu = <IDu, IDB, PKU, Epx, Stat, Info>SKB [Ri, Sh'96] 
The certificate might contain a number of things, but above are listed: user's and 
bank's ID, users public key, expiration date, credit status or limitation, and other 
information. The Info field might contain maximum spending limits per vendor per 
day for the user. The certificate is signed by the banks secret key. 
The certificate authorizes the user to produce micropayments. A vendor can verify a 
certificate through the bank's signature, and can thus trust to be redeemed by the 
bank. The certificate needs to be reissued with certain (fairly frequent) intervals. 
The user contacts the vendor to make a purchase. The vendor sends purchase 
information back, including pricing and currency. The user will send a commitment to 
the vendor: 
Commitment = <IDv, Certjj, Time, Curr, Root>SKu 
Commitment 
Signature verifying 
the root of thie 
signature-chain 
The commitment contains: 
vendor's ID, the user's 
certificate (including user ID), 
a timestamp, the currency for 
the payments and the public 
parts of the root of a signature 
chain. Root refers to the 
identification of the root of the 
signature chain: 
HASH(i) = H(J{(y[i, child, *]) 
So,Q 11 valueo) 
The commitment is signed by 
the user's secret key. 
5.3.4 Payment 
After the commitment has 
been given to the vendor, the 
user is ready to start sending payments. The public in node 0 in the signature chain 
Figure 5.1: 
Each signature node has a hash chain attached to it. 
The node is identified by its public values, the public 
part of the child signature, y[i, child, the root of the 
hash chain, So.o, and monetary the value per link value{. 
is sent to the vendor, along with the root of the hash chain attached to that signature 
node. 
The vendor can verify these vales computing HASH(O) can compare this to the value 
Root in the Commitment. 
A new signature node with a corresponding hash chain can easily be created if a hash 
chain runs out, or the user needs to change denomination per payment. 
The signature nodes are easy to make (and can be pre made, if this suits the particular 
application). This allows the user to produce many hash chains of different 
denominations and lengths as needed. Each link in a specific hash chain will have the 
same value, but each chain can have different values per link. Thus the user can send 
links from different hash chains depending on the payment that is to be made. 
Each hash chain has the same index as the signature node it belongs to, and each link 
in the hash chain will have a second index, internal to the hash chain. 
Signature node / will be used to sign the root 0 of the hash chain Su, -p. i is the 
depth of the node in the signature chain, and p is the length of the hash chain attached 
to node /. 
5.3.5 A payment example 
User U contacts vendor Fto purchase information on web pages. The user needs to 
produce a hash chain to make payments. This chain can be made in advance, before U 
contacts V, since the hash chain is independent of the vendor and the token values in 
question. Let the chain of length p be so,o, so,i, , so^p. so,o is the root of the hash 
chain and is authenticated through the commitment 
F wants payment in US$, and each web page costs $0.05. U sends the public parts of 
the signatures in the root node: y[0, child, *7, so,o and valueo=0.05. Uthen sends a 
commitment: 
Commitment = <IDv, Certu, Time, US$, HASH(0)>SKu 
HASH(O) is the identifying number for the root of the signature chain. Fcan verify the 
commitment with ITs signature SKu, and the bank's signature SKB on the certificate 
Certu. 
U can now do a series of payments worth five cents each. This is done by sending the 
next hnk in the hash chain, together with that Unk's index to V. 
Payment = (soJ, 0, j ) J ^ 
V can verify this payment by checking that soj = H( soj+i) , j<p. 
If U then wants to buy a piece of information goods worth 2 cents, he can easily make 
a new hash chain worth two cents per Hnk. A new node in the signature chain must be 
made, and this node must be authenticated by its parent, namely node O.U SQnásy[l, 
child, *] , and value\=0.02 to V. V can verify the authenticity of node 1 by 
checking child, *] up against HASH(l). 
A hash chain must be made with a finite length. This is one of the common criticisms 
used against hash chains: A user must make a chain of a chosen length, and if he does 
not use the whole hash chain he will have done unnecessary computations. On the 
other hand, if the hash chain proves to be too short, another hash chain must be made, 
and another public signature used to sign a new commitment containing the new 
chain. This problem will not occur with this scheme. Each hash chain can be made 
relatively short. If a hash chain of a certain denomination is exhausted, the user can 
just make a new hash chain signed by the next node in the signature chain. 
5.3.6 Redemption 
The vendor contacts the bank and sends the following data: The commitment, the 
public part of each signature child, *J, all hash chain roots si,0 and every link 
value valuci. The bank can verify the authenticity of each payment in the same way 
the vendor did upon payment. The vendor will be redeemed if the bank finds the 
payments to be authentic, and the user's account will be charged for the same amount. 
5.3.6 A problem with size 
A problem with this scheme is that the one-time signatures can be relatively large. As 
will be shown in Section 6.6.2, the public;; of a typical Wintemitz signature will be 
880 bytes long, as will the signature. This can prove a problem, as the vendors will 
have to store a lot of information. 
Adding a closing protocol 
A step to end a series of payments can be added to reduce the size of the data stored 
by the vendor. 
Whenever a user is finished dealing with a vendor he will make a new commitment, 
signing off the amount he as actually spent with the vendor. This commitment will be 
very much like the starting commitment: 
Commitment = <IDv, Certu, Time, Curr, Root, Value>SKu 
The only difference is that a last data field, Value, has been added to the end of the 
commitment. It will be impossible for the vendor to cash in both the opening- and the 
ending commitment, since both of them contain the same Root. 
If the user tries to cheat by making the value in the closing commitment smaller than 
the amount he has spent, the vendor can choose to ignore the closing commitment and 
show the individual payments to the bank. The same will be done if the user for some 
reason does not send a closing commitment at all. If the vendor finds the closing 
commitment to contain the right amount and to be authentic, he can delete the 
opening commitment and all individual payments, using only the closing commitment 
to be redeemed by the bank. 
5.3.7 Further possible improvements 
Security improvement. 
Each one time signature can sign the number of links released in the hash chain 
belonging to its parent node. 
Bootstrapping 
This payment system can be boot strapped to a full-blown macropayment system, 
much like jiiKP, [Ha, St, Wa'96]. The commitment will then be replaced with a 
regular payment in the macropayment system, except the value of the macropayment 
will contain the root of the signature chain rather than just a monetary value. 
Probabilistic poling 
Probabilistic polling as in [Ja, Od'97] can be used to discourage overspending. This 
way, the bank can keep better control of the users potential overspending. 
5.4 Properties of the payment scheme 
These are properties any hash chain based payment system canl gain by using the 
scheme described in this chapter. The main improvement is flexibility in several 
areas. 
• The payment scheme trades time saving and flexibility in several areas for signature 
sizes. 
• It becomes easier and quicker to change denomination per payment. In most 
payment systems based on hash chains, the user can simply skip several links to 
make a larger payment. However, this technique cannot be used to make a smaller 
payment. The system presented here makes it easy to change denomination due to 
quick Wintemitz signatures. 
This type of down grading of link values can be useful if the customer starts buying 
information that costs less, for example cheaper articles, or the cost of a phone call 
changes from peak to off-peak price. 
• It is very easy to handle multiple currencies. Each commitment can have a different 
currency, as is the case with most payment systems. Additionally, each separate 
hash chain can actually have a new currency, although this might not have an 
immediate real world use at the moment. 
• The same signature chain can be used within the same electronic warehouse, where 
there is a degree of trust amongst the vendors, much like described in Pay Tree, [Ju, 
Yu'96]. A party trusted by all vendors (this might be any vendor in the warehouse) 
verify the commitment, and a new hash chain is made for each vendor in the 
warehouse. The vendors contact each other to verify separate nodes in the signature 
chain. 
• More flexibility is offered with regards to the length of the hash chains. A new 
chain can be made more often, since the computational cost of making a new hash 
chain is cheaper. 
• The system is flexible with regards to the available hardware. Computations can be 
done ahead of time, or during run time, depending on memory and processor power. 
All the links in a hash chain can be stored, or each link can be computed from the 
secret s„ each time a payment is made. 
Signature nodes can be made and sorted for later, since no part of the one-time 
signature is revealed before it is used, and a node in a signature chain is completely 
independent of its parent until it is used. 
5.5 Further work and open questions 
5.5.1 Anonymity 
Anonymity is a general problem in micropayment schemes, and the system described 
above does not solve this problem. The two most obvious solutions to anonymity is 
making the system on-line, of use special hardware, both of which are quite 
expensive. The reader is referred to Chapter 3 for a more thorough discussion on 
anonymity in micropayment schemes. 
Providing anonymity with hardware 
With the use of hardware, this system can provide anonymity with a few extensions, 
much like described in Brands' paper on Electronic Cash, [Br'99]. First of all, each 
user must have a piece of hardware that they use when they make payments. 
The user will withdraw money from his bank account, and this cash value will be 
stored in the tamper resistant piece of hardware. The payment system has thus 
changed from being credit based to being pre paid. 
The bank will issue blank cheques that are signed with one-show blind signatures. 
Each cheque will contain the root of a signature chain, and a maximum spending limit 
for that cheque. When a user contacts a vendor, he will send a cheque rather than a 
commitment. 
The rest of the payment protocol proceeds as described above, except that the 
hardware device keeps track of the user's spending. This prevents the user from 
spending more money than what was withdrawn from the account. 
During redemption, the bank needs to verify its own signature on the cheques sent in 
by the vendor. 
5.5.2 Overspending 
Users have the opportunity to overspend in this system. That is, they may spend more 
money than their credit limit or account balance. However, they will find it difficult 
escaping the bill since the bank knows the identity of the user. We can assume that the 
situation will be similar to when people overspend their credit card limits today. 
Unless the scheme makes use of special hardware, or the scheme is on-li-e, it is very 
difficult (or impossible?) to prevent this kind of behaviour. Penalties can be used 
against overspenders, but they cannot be stopped altogether. Again, this is a general 
problem for software based and off-line schemes. Over- and double spending is 
possible, but the person doing so will be caught, and most likely made to pay by a 
bank or other financial institution. 
5.5.3 Other signature schemes 
There is no reason why this scheme can't be used with another one-time signature 
scheme. The more efficient and secure the signature scheme is, the more efficient and 
secure the payment scheme will be. This is particularly true with regards to the size of 
the signature scheme. 
5.5.4 Further areas for study 
-Wenbo Mao describes a system using Schnorr signatures described in [Mao'96]. This 
system lets the bank reveal the user's secret key SKu after double spending. This 
might be a good way to improve security for the scheme described here. 
-Transferability between users should be made possible. In theory, this can be done by 
letting the payee act as a vendor and receive payments as per the normal protocol. 
Alternatively, as long as the system is off-line and credit based it might be sufficient 
with a digitally signed commitment. lOU. 

Chapter 6 
Implementation of the proposed improvements to hash 
chain based payment systems 
The implementation has been done in C++, using the Microsoft Visual Studio 
development environment. Crypto++, a library provided by Wei Dai, [Dai'Ol], has 
been included to provide the cryptographic functions. 
The implementations could have been done in either C++ or Java. There are two main 
reasons why C++ was chosen. 
First, the cryptographic libraries available for Java are still a bit limited, even after the 
US export laws on cryptography have changed. The standard JCA and JCE provided 
by SUN seemed a bit limiting, even though the implementation does not use a lot of 
cryptographic functions. 
Second, C++ it is the preferred language of the author. 
Notation in this chapter 
Until now, symbols and letters have been written in italic; for example the x matrix of 
a Wintemitz signature. It is common to use courier when writing source code, as it 
makes it easier to read. All letters and symbols referring directly to a variable in the 
code will now be written in courier as well; for example the private member x of class 
Wintemitz. However, when referring to general concepts like "the public ;; values" 
italic will still be used. 
6.1 Outline of the programs 
An implementation has been done to get hands on experience with the micropayment 
system described in Chapter 5. 





class Winternitz is an implementation of Wintermitz's improvement on Merkle's 
signature scheme. It takes a SHA digest as an argument, and makes a Winternitz 
signature on it. 
class WinternitzShort is a re-make of class Winternitz Optimised for 
producing smaller signatures. The main change is the most of the private members are 
re-computed every time they are needed rather than stored. Some of the functions 
have been modified for this purpose, and there are several variations of some of the 
functions in order to avoid unnecessary computations. Due to the class's similarity to 
calss Winternitz, the source code will not be discussed in detail below. See 
Appendix C for the source. 
class Node is the implementation of the signature node described in Chapter 5. Its 
main contents are the root of a hash chain, the face value of each link in the hash 
chain, and a Winternitz signature to authenticate it's child node. 
class Tree is the Specialized version of the Merkle authentication tree, called a 
signature chain in Chapter 5. It is a "tree" structure build up of instances of class 
Node, but each node has only one child, making it into a chain. 
6.2 class Winternitz 
The author has implemented the Winternitz signature scheme described in Chapter 4. 
This scheme (as well as the original Merkle scheme) is often considered a theoretical 
signature system, due to the size of the authentication path involved in verifying a 
signature. However, with the custom application and modifications done in Chapter 5, 
it can become useful in practice. This prospect needs to be explored, and this 
implementation has become a significant part of this thesis. 
The Winternitz improvement to the Merkle one-time signature scheme can reduce the 
signature size with a factor of about 4 to 8 [Me'89]. It can be used to reduce the size 
more, but this will make the scheme too computationally expensive. 
This implementation makes it possible to choose if that factor should be 4 or 8 (see 
next Section: 6.2.1). That way, signature size or computation speed can be chosen as 
first priority, depending on the situation. 
class winternitz makes a Winternitz signature on a message of length 160 bits. It 
is assumed that this is a SHA-1 digest of the message to be signed. What is described 
in Section 4.3 as the message, is thus always expected to be a digest of the message. 
The actual information to sign is of no interest to class winternitz, only a digest of 
that information. In this chapter, "message" literally means "digest of the message". 
6.2.1 Global values 
These constants are defined at the beginning of wintemitz.h. 
As mentioned above, the size saving factor of the Winternitz scheme can be chosen. 
Setting the value of these two global constants before compilation does this: 
const short unsigned int elementLen=4; 
const short unsigned int elementPerByte=2; 
elementLen describes how many bits will be signed by each jv value. This 
corresponds to the value k in Section 4.3. 
elementPerByte says how many sub elements there will be in each byte. The 
signatures will be smaller and slower if elementLen is set to 8 and elementPerByte 
to 1. 
const short unsigned int digestLen=SHA::DIGESTSIZE; 
digestLen is simply the length of the message to sign, which is the length of a 
SHA-1 digest. At the time of implementation this is 160 bits. 
A checksum is appended to the message to sign, as described in Section 4.3. The 
length of this checksum is described by 
const short unsigned int checkLen=sizeof(short unsigned); 
t 
The value of the check sum is set by C = ^^^^^ - w j < . /=i 
t is the number of sub elements of the message. 
^2elementLen elementPerByte * digestLen 
C gets the largest value if each mrO, so C gets a maximum value: 
= 160 = 40960. 
A variable of length 16 bits is needed to hold this number, so the checksum can be 
represented by a short unsigned int. 
6.2.2 Private members 
The data type byte is used for several of the members. Byte is defined as unsigned 
char in the crypto++ library. 
byte **x 
These are the secret values of the signature. They are generated at random. 
byte **y 
Generated from x by applying multiple hash functions. This matrix is public. 
short unsigned int xyLen 
The number of x's and y's that is needed for the signature. xyLen will normally be set 
equal to (digestLen+checkLen) *elementPerByte. This will be 22 or 44, depending 
on the value chosen for elementPerByte. 
byte *subVal 
These are the sub elements described in Section 4.3. 
short unsigned int subLen 
This is the number of sub elements in subvai. If subLen is set to a value, it will be 
the same as xyLen. 
byte *m 
The message to be signed. Again, this is assumed to be a SHA-1 digest of length 160 
bits. 
short unsigned int mLen 
The length of m. It is assumed to be 160 bits (since a SHA-1 digest is 160 bits). 
short unsigned int n 
This is the maximum value of a sub element. In Section 4.2 this is described as 2 \ 
which is equal to in this implementation. 
byte **signature 
This is the signature matrix described as S in Section 4.3. 
6.2.3 Constructors 
Winternitz(); The default constructor calls initialise (), and makes the x and y matrices. 
Winternitz(byte messDigest[], short unsigned int messDigestLen); 
Makes a signature object, and creates a signature on the message messDigest. 
messDigest is assumed to be a SHA-1 digest, and messDigestLen is thus assumed to 
be 20, since a SHA-1 digest is 20 bytes. 
winternitz(byte messDigest[], short unsigned int messDigestLen, byte 
**yTest); 
This constructor does not make the x matrix, and the y matrix is sent to it as an 
argument. The subval matrix is made, and a signature can later be sent to the 
Winternitz object to see if it the signature corresponds with messDigest and yTest. 
'-WinternitzQ; 
Standard destructor that deletes the arrays made by calls to new. 
6.2.4 Private functions 
void initialize 0 ; 
Creates the secret x matrix and the corresponding public y matrix. A few other data 




for(short unsigned int i=0; i<mLen; i++) 
subVal[i]=m[i]; 
else 
for(short unsigned int i=0; i<mLen; i++) 
splitByte (m [i] , ScSubVal [i*elementPerByte] ) ; 
} 
Makes the matrix subval. If each sub element is 1 byte long, then subVal will be 
equal to the message m. Otherwise, each byte in m must be split into two bytes, 
padding the high order bits with 0. 
void winternitz: : splitByte (const byte vai, byte * splitArray) 
{ 
byte mask = 128; 
for(short unsigned int i=0; i<elementPerByte; i++) 
splitArray[i]=0 ; 




s p l i t A r r a y [ i ] < < = 1 ; 
if (val Sc m a s k ) / / P u s h 1, e l s e p u s h 0 
s p l i t A r r a y [ i ] = s p l i t A r r a y [i] |l; 
m a s k > > = l ; 
} ^ 
This function takes a byte val, and splits it into several bytes that are put into the 
array splitArray. The functionality is easiest explained with an example. 
L e t e l e m e n t P e r B y t e b e 2 a n d elementLen b e 4 . 
v a l = 1 0 0 1 0110 
m a s k = 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
s p l i t A r r a y [ 0 ] = 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
s p l i t A r r a y [ 1 ] = 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
The inner for-loop tests if a 1 or a 0 should be pushed into s p l i t A r r a y [o]. The four 
rounds in this for loop will produce these value (after the if-statement, but before 
raask>>=l): 
m a s k =1000 0000 (i 
s p l i t A r r a y [ 0 ] = 0 0 0 0 0001 
m a s k =0100 0000 (ii 
s p l i t A r r a y [ 0 ] = 0 0 0 0 0010 
m a s k =0010 0000 (iii 
s p l i t A r r a y [ 0 ] = 0 0 0 0 0100 
m a s k =0001 0000 (iv 
s p l i t A r r a y [ 0 ] = 0 0 0 0 1001 
The next four rounds will produce splitArray [i] in a similar fashion: 
m a s k =0000 1000 (v 
splitArray[1] =0000 0000 
m a s k =0100 0010 (vi 
splitArray[1] =0000 0001 
m a s k =0010 0100 (vii 
s p l i t A r r a y [ 1 ] = 0 0 0 0 0011 
m a s k =0001 0001 (viii 
s p l i t A r r a y [1]=0000 0110 
The byte val has thus been split in two, in the same way as described in Section 4.3. 
This corresponds to the message Mbeing split into mj and m2 in example 4.3.1: 
v a l = 1 0 0 1 0110 
s p l i t A r r a y [ 0 ] = 0 0 0 0 1001 
s p l i t A r r a y [ 1 ] = 0 0 0 0 0110 
v o i d w i n t e r n i t z : i m a k e C h e c k S u m O 
{ 
short u n s i g n e d c=0;//the integer v a l u e of the c h e c k s u m 
short u n s i g n e d int i=0;//loop counter 
int j = 0 ; / / l o o p counter 
short u n s i g n e d cLen=checkLen; 
byte * cVal = new byte[checkLen];//Binary representation of c 
//Compute the check sum 
for(i=0; i<subLen-(checkLen*elementPerByte); i++) 
c+=(n-subVal[i]); 




short unsigned int k=cLen-l;//Last index of cVal 
if(elementPerByte==l)//cVal can be copied straight into subVal 
for(j=tempVal; j<subLen; j++) 
subVal[j]=cVal[k--]/ 
else 
for(j=tempVal; j<subLen; j+=2) 
^ splitByte(cVal[k--], &subVal[j])/ 
This makes the checksum of the message m. The equation of the check sum is found in 
Section 4.3, and the first for-loop does this calculation. The next for-loop just 
initialises the elements in cVal to zero. 
The line cvai= (byte*) &c; casts c to the byte array cvai. (At first it can seem like 
the casting "reverses" the two bytes in c when they are put into cVai, so a small 
example is in order). 
A quick example: 
c = 374 = 00000001 01110110 
cVal[0] = 01110110 
cVal[l] = 00000001 
In the last if-statement the checksum cVai is appended to the array subVal. This is 
done in a similar fashion to what is done in computeSubvai. If element PerByte is 1, 
then a simple copy can be used. Otherwise, spiitByte must be used. 
As is shown in the example above, the copying from cVai to subvai must be done 
from the highest index of cval. 
If spiitByte is used, then the address to the right index in subVal is sent as the 
destination of the split. Here is a small example where spiitByte is used to append the 
checksum above into the last four elements in subvai. 
subVal[40]= 0000.0000 
cVai[o] = _subVal [41]=00.Qi]^0001 
subVal [42] = 0000^0111 
cVal[l] =(00^(000^ subVal[43]= 0000 0110 
"Padding" 
void Winternitz::produceX0 { 
short unsigned i; 
X = new byte * [xyLen]; 
for(i =0; i < xyLen; i++) 




randPool. Put ( (byte*) Scseed, sizeof (seed) ) ; 
for(i=0; i<xyLen; i++) 
randPool.GenerateBlock(x[i] , SHA: :DIGESTSIZE)/ 
} 
The values in the x matrix are secret, and created at random. Creating a secret, secure 
and random seed is a research area in itself, and not a focus of this thesis. A function 
in the crypto++ library is used to create a seed, and the rest of the x matrix is 
generated from this seed using a pseudorandom function. If we can assume the seed is 
secure, then the rest of the matrix will be secure as well. 
void Winternitz::produceY() { 
short unsigned i, j; 
y = new byte *[xyLen]; 
ford = 0; i < xyLen; i++) 
y[i] = new byte[SHA::DIGESTSIZE]; 
SHA hash; 
for(i=0; i<xyLen; i++) 
^ hash.CalculateDigest(y[i] , x[i], SHA: :DIGESTSIZE) ; 
for(j=l; j<n; j++) 
hash.CalculateDigest(y[i] , y[i], SHA::DIGESTSIZE); 
} 
As shown in Section A3:yk=^(xk). This means that each element in x must be 
hashed n number of times to get the corresponding element in y. The SHA object 
hash is used for all the hashing operations. Inside the second for-loop, y [i] is set 
equal to the digest of x [ i ] . This is the first hashing. 
Then, in the inner for-loop, y [i] is set equal to the digest of itself This is done n -1 
times, giving n hashes of x [ i ] to produce y [ i ]. 
void Winternitz::produceSignature() { 
short unsigned i, j, k; 
signature = new byte * [subLen]; 
for(i = 0 ; i < subLen; i++) 
signature[i] = new byte[SHA::DIGESTSIZE]; 
SHA hash; 









for(k=0; k<SHA::DIGESTSIZE; k++) 
signature [i] [k]=x[i] [k] ; 
} 
} 
The signature is produced by hashing the x values a given number of times. The 
number of hashes being done is set by the value in the corresponding value in subvai. 
SHAO .CalculateDigest (signature [i] , x[i] , SHA: :DIGESTSIZE) ; makes 
signature [i] into a hash value of x [i], and then 
SHAO.CalculateDigest(signature [i], signature[i], SHA::DIGESTSIZE); 
hashes signature [i] subVal [i] -1 times more. 
If subval [i] is zero, then no hashing is done, and the x value can just be copied into 
signature. 
6.2.5 Public functions 
bool getSignature(byte **sign, byte **yTemp); 
If either of the two private members signature or y are not initialised, the function 
returns false. Otherwise it returns true. 
The argument sign is set equal to the private signature, and yTemp is set equal to 
the private y. 
int getxyLenO {return xyLen;} 
Returns the length of the x and y matrices; the number of x's and y's needed in this 
signature object. 
bool getY(byte ** yTemp); 
If the private member y is not initialised, the function returns false. Otherwise it 
returns true. 
The argument yTemp is set equal to the private y. 
short verifySignature0; 
This is a test function that lets a signature object test it's signature on its own message. 
The function returns -1 if the private member signature is not initialised. It returns 0 
if signature is not a valid Wintemitz signature on the private member m. Otherwise 
it returns 1. 
The code is very similar to verifySignature (byte **testSign), SO see the 
description of this function for details. 






byte tempCheck[SHA:rDIGESTSIZE] ; 
unsigned short i, j, k, t; 
SHA hash; 
for(i=0; i<subLen; i++) { 
for(k=0; k<SHA:iDIGESTSIZE; k++) 
tempCheck [k]=testSign[i] [k] ; 
for(j=subVal[i]; j<n; j++) 
hash.CalculateDigest(tempCheck, tempCheck, 
SHA::DIGESTSIZE); 
for(t=0; t<SHA::DIGESTSIZE; t++) 
if(y[i][t]!=tempCheck[t]) 
^ return 0; 
return 1; 
This fiinction tests if testsign is a valid signature on the message in the signature 
object. The fiinction returns -1 if any of the private members signature or y are not 
initiaHsed. It returns 0 if testsign is not a vaHd Wintemitz signature on the private 
member m. Otherwise it returns 1. 
Normally, this fiinction will be called on an object that have been created with the 
constructor that takes a y-matrix as an argument, since such an object does not have a 
signature on it's own. 
Each line in testsign is copied into tempCheck for verification up against the 
corresponding line in y. Then, tempCheck is hashed a number of time equal n-
subvai [i]. Each element in tempCheck should now be the same as the corresponding 
value in y. This is controlled in the last for-loop and if-statement. 
void update(byte messDigest[], short unsigned int messDigestLen); 
Called on signature objects to update the message the object should make a signature 
on. The object's x and y are not changed, so update should (out of security reasons) 
only be called once on each object, and only on objects created with the default 
constructor. 
6.3 class Node 
This class represents signature nodes in the signature chain described in Section 5.3. 
The main content of each are: the root of a hash chain, a face value per link in that 
chain, and a Wintemitz signature used to authenticate the child of the node. 
class Node is intended to be used in conjunction with class Tree, class Tree 
needs access to a few of class Node's private members, and is therefore a friend of 
class Node. 
6.3.1 Private members 
int depth; 
A node-object is assumed to be in a tree, and this is the node's depth in that tree, 
float face; 
This is the face value of each Hnk in the node's hash chain, face is used to make the 
node's identification number id. 
byte chainRoot[SHA::DIGESTSIZE]; 
This is the root of the hash chain attached to the node. This value is considered to be 
public, and is used to make the node's identification number id. 
byte chainEnd[SHA::DIGESTSIZE]; 
This is the secret base number for the hash chain attached to the node. It is generated 
at random, and chainRoot can be derived from it. 
int chainLen; 
The length of the local hash chain. 
byte id[SHA::DIGESTSIZE]; 
This is the identification number of the node. It is made from the member variables 
ChainRoot, face, and the public y-matrix from the Wintemitz signature wchild. 
int index; 
Current index of the local hash chain, 
wintemitz wChild; 
Signature object for the node's child. This is used to make to node's identification 
number id. 
Node * child; 
Pointer to the node's child node. 
6.3.2 Constructors 
Node::Node(int d, float f , int n. Node* c) 
This constructor is the only one implemented, and will often take only the first three 
arguments. As can be seen in node. h, the argument c has a default value of NULL, as 
it will normally be set at a later time. The hash chain for the node is generated, and the 
node's id is calculated. 
6.3.3 Private functions 
void Node::computeId() 
{ 
byte ** childY=new byte *[wChild.getxyLen()]; 
for(int i=0; i<wChiId.getxyLen0; i++) 



















The identification number for the signature nodes have been modified a bit from the 
original Wintemitz scheme. See Section 4.3 for details on this. 
The id consists of three digests that are hashed together. The three digests are: 
• A digest of all the values in the Wintemitz signature wchi id. 
• A digest of the root of the hash chain in the node. 
• A digest of the face value in the node. 
The SHA object hash is used for all the hashing operations. In the first for-loop, each 
line in chiidY is added to hash, and the resulting digest is stored in chiidTemp. 
After the call to hash. Final (chiidTemp), the SHA object hash is reset and ready to 
start receiving new arguments. 
A digest of chainRoot is stored in the variable chainTemp, and a digest of face is 
stored in f aceTemp. 
Then all three temporary digests are added to hash, producing the last digest id. 




hash.CalculateDigest(chainRoot, chainEnd, SHA::DIGESTSIZE); 
for(int j=l; j<chainLen-l/ j++) 
hash.CalculateDigest(chainRoot, chainRoot, 
^ SHA::DIGESTSIZE); 
The hash chain is generated from a random base number. This number is the private 
member chainEnd, generated by the random function rng.GrerateBlock. The rest of 
the chain is generated in the for-loop, ending with chainRoot. 
It may seem odd that the last value created is called chainRoot, and not the other way 
around. This is because chainRoot is the first element to be sent to a vendor when 
transaction commences [Ri, Sh'96]. 
void Node::getChainEnd(byte ce[]) { 
for(short unsigned int i=0; i<SHA::DIGESTSIZE; i++) 
ce [i] =chainEnd ["i] ; } 
This ñinction is not strictly necessary, but implemented to keep things tidy. It is 
intended for friends of class Node. The argument ce is set to the same value as the 
private member chainEnd. 
Node * Node::getchild(); 
This function is not strictly necessary, but implemented to keep things tidy. It is 
intended for friends of class Node. The node's pointer to its child is returned. 
6.3.4 Public functions 
void Node:rsetChild(Node * c); 
The node's child is set to the node pointed to by c. 
void Node::getld(byte ID[]); 
The nodes private member id is copied into the argument ID. 
int Node::getDepth(){return depth;} 
Returns the depth of the node. 
float Node::getFace0{return face;} 
Returns the face value, face, of each link in the node's hash chain. 
int Node::getChainLen(){return chainLen;} 
Returns the length of the node's hash chain. 
bool Node::getChildSignature(byte **sign, byte **yTemp) 
{return wChild.getSignature(sign, yTemp);} 
The two public parts of the child signature wchild are given, through the 
getSignature - funct ion in class Winternitz. 
void Node::getChainRoot(byte cr[]); 
The node's private member chainRoot is copied into the argument cr. 
int Node::getLink(byte link[]); 
The current link in the hash chain is copied into the argument link. This is the hash 
value indexed by the private member index. Note that index is not updated by this 
function. 
int Node::getLinkNext(byte link[]); 
The current link in the hash chain is copied into the argument link. This is the hash 
value indexed by the private member index, index is incremented one step towards 
chainEnd. 
6.4 class Tree 
class Tree is the signature chain described in Section 5.3. It consists of nodes of the 
type class Node. Most of the functions in class Tree simply call the corresponding 
function in class Node. 
6.4.1 Private members 
Node * rootPtr; 
A pointer to the root node of the tree. This is the first node, and is not the child of any 
other node in the tree. 
Node * endPtr; 
A pointer to the last node of the tree. This is the last node, and does not have any 
child. 
Node * currentPtr; 
This pointer points to the current node in the tree. currentPtr can be moved up and 
down in the structure between rootPtr and endPtr. The current node represents the 
node from which the user is spending links (making payments). 
6.4.2 Constructors 
Tree::Tree() 
Sets all three private members to NULL. 
6.4.3 Public functions 
Most of the public functions are inline, and quite self-explanatory. 
void insertNode(float face, int n); 
Creates a new node in the tree. Both currentPtr and endPtr is set to this new node. 
int getDepthO {return endPtr->getDepth (); } 
Returns the depth of the tree. 
void getRootId(byte ID []){rootPtr->getId(ID);} 
Returns the identification number id of the tree's root node. 
bool up 0 ; 
Moves the current pointer, currnetPtr, up one level. That is, the currentPtr will 
point to the parent of the node it just pointed to. If the currentPtr is already at the 
top of the tree, the function returns false. Otherwise it returns true. 
bool down(); 
Moves the current pointer, currnetPtr, down one level. That is, the currentPtr will 
point to the child of the node it just pointed to. If the currentPtr is already at the 
bottom of the tree, the function returns false. Otherwise it returns true. 
void start 0 ; 
Sets the current pointer, currentPtr, to point to the root node of the tree (same as 
rootPtr). 
void end 0 ; 
Sets the current pointer, currentPtr, to point to the last node in the tree (same as 
endPtr). 
int getSignatureSize 0 {return currentPtr->wChild.getxyLen () ; } 
Returns the size of the Wintemitz signatures used in the tree. 
float getCurrentFace0{return currentPtr->getFace(); } 
Returns the face value, face, of the node pointed to by currentPtr. 
int getCurrentDepthO{return currentPtr->getDepth() ; } 
Returns the depth (in the tree structure) of the node pointed to by currentPtr. 
int getCurrentChainLenO {return currentPtr->getChainLen() ; } 
Returns the length of the hash chain attached to the node pointed to by currentPtr. 
int getCurrentlndexO{return currentPtr->getIndex();} 
Returns the index of the current Hnk in the hash chain attached to the node pointed to 
by currentPtr. 
void getCurrentId(byte ID[]){currentPtr->getld(ID);} 
The identification number id in the node pointed to by currentPtr is copied into the 
argument ID. 
void getCurrentChainRoot(byte cr []){currentPtr->getChainRoot(cr);} 
The root of the hash chain attached to the node pointed to by currentPtr is copied 
into the argument cr. 
int getCurrentLink(byte link[]){return currentPtr->getLink(link);} 
The current link in the hash chain attached to the node pointed to by currentPtr is 
copied into the argument link. Note that the index in the hash chain is not updated by 
this function. 
int getCurrentLinkNext(byte link[]){return currentPtr-
>getLinkNext(link);} 
The current link in the hash chain attached to the node pointed to by currentPtr is 
copied into the argument link. The hash chain index is incremented one step towards 
chainEnd. 
bool getCurrentSignature (byte **sign, byte **yTeinp) 
{return currentPtr->getChildSignature(sign, yTemp);} 
The signature-matrix and the y-matrix in the Wintemitz signature in the node 
pointed to by currentPtr are copied into the arguments sign and yTemp. 
bool getCurrentY(byte **yTeinp) 
{return currentPtr->wChild.getY(yTemp) ;} 
The y-matrix in the Wintemitz signature in the node pointed to by currentPtr is 
copied into the argument yTemp. 
bool currentEmptyO {return currentPtr->index==currentPtr->chainLen; } 
Returns false if the hash chain attached to the node pointed to by current Pt r is 
excused. Returns true otherwise. 
6.5 The test programs 
A series of tests have been run to find how long some of the key operations for 







The source code for these tests will not be described in detail here. The reader is 
referred to the end of Appendix C for the code. The results of some of these tests are 
discussed in Section 6.6. 
Most of the tests for timing have been done on the author's personal computer: 
ADM K7 
600 MHz 
128 MB RAM 
Running Windows 2000 
The same tests have also been run on different computers to provide more thorough 
information on the performance. These times are provided in Appendix A. 
It would valuable to test the implementations on other operating systems; especially 
different UNIX flavours. However, this has been left out due to limited access to such 
systems with the appropriate cryptographic libraries. 
6.6 Time requirements and signature sizes 
Two different implementations of the Wintemitz signature have been done. One is 
optimised for speed, and the other for minimizing memory requirements for the 
signer. 
Each Wintemitz signature has three major components: 
The secret matrix x. 
The public matrix y. 
The signature matrix signature. 
In addition, a few other private members are needed to support the classes, the most 
important being the sub elements that are stored in the matrix subvai. 
6.6.1 Timing 
class Wintemitz as described above is optimised for quick signing, but can 
produce rather large signatures. With this implementation a Wintemitz signature can 
be signed about 14 times as fast as a DSA signature and 28 times as fast as an RSA 
signature. This is after a more complex and time consuming set up of the signature 
object has already been made, but this set up does not need to be done in real time. If 
the set up is included, the Wintemitz signature is about 4 times as fast as DSA and 7 
times as fast an RSA signature. 
The verification speeds are the same for both the standard and the short Wintemitz 
signature. Verifying a signature takes about 1.5 longer than an RSA (1024) signature, 
but it is about 16 faster than the DSA (1024) signature verification. 
As mentioned in Section 6.2, the Wintemitz size improvement to the Merkle scheme 
can be adjusted. According to [ME'87], the size can be reduced by a factor between 4 
and 8. This can be done in the implementation by changing the value of elementLen 
i n wintemitz .h. 
elementLen = 8 
correspond to a size reduction factor of 8, using one hash sum to sign 8 bits. 
elementLen = 4 
correspond to a size reduction factor of 4, using one hash sum to sign 4 bits. 
In the following tables, figures for both of these size factors are given. It is quite clear 
that a reduction factor of 8 is too much, since the computational times become too 
large. Using elementLen=8 with class winternitz, the signature initiation takes 
about as long as a DSA signature, and the actual signing is only about twice as fast as 
the DSA signing. Signature verification is also slowed down, but is still to about twice 
as fast as a DSA signature verification. The figures given where elementLen=8 are 
provided to show that larger size reduction factors cannot be used. 
The table below show how long it takes to produce each of the private members. Each 
member takes the same amount of time in the standard and the short version of 
Winternitz, but the size reduction factor makes a difference. The global constant 
elementLen decides the reduction factor, and times for both 4 and 8 are provided. 
elementLen 
Number of operations needed 
Time taken for all 
operations 
4 8 4 8 
Initiate x takes 1 random seeding 1 random seeding 0.71 0.71 ms 
Produce x takes 44 random gen. 22 random gen. 1.06 0.53 ms 
Produce y takes 704 hash sums 5632 hash sums 4.81 39.5 ms 
Produce signature takes 352 hash sums 2816 hash sums 2.41 19.25 ms 
Produce subVal bit shift operations bit shift operations 0.01 0.01 ms 
able 6.1 
The number of operations needed and required time to make the private data 
members in class winternitz and class WinternitzShort. 
Table 6.2 shows how long each of the major operations in generating a Wintemitz 
signature takes. The signature objects can be made at any point in time, and even 
stored for later use if this is convenient. This is the case in the payment system 
described in Chapter 5. Naturally, both the signing and the signature verifications will 
be done in real time, as a payee confirms payments from a payer. 
Standard Wintemitz Short Wintemitz 
elementLen 4 8 4 8 
Make signature object Initiate x 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 ms 
Produce x 1.06 0.53 ms 
Produce y 4.81 38.5 ms 
Produce subVai 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 ms 
Total 6.59 39.75 0.72 0.72 ms 
Make a signature Produce x 1.06 0.53 ms 
Produce y 4.81 38.5 ms 
Produce signature 2.41 19.25 2.41 19.25 ms 
Total 2.41 19.25 8.28 58.28 ms 
Verify a signature Produce subVai 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 ms 
Produce signature 2.41 19.25 2.41 19.25 ms 
Total 2.42 19.26 2.42 19.26 ms 
Table 6.2 
Time required to do the three main operations in class wintemitz and class 
wintemitzshort, broken down into each sub operation. 
Table 6.3 shows how long it takes to do signing and verification with class 
wintemitz, class WinternitzShort, DSA and RSA. A 1024 bit key is used for 
both DSA and RSA. 
elementLen 4 8 
Initialise Wintemitz object 6.59 39.75 ms 
Make Wintemitz signature 2.41 19.25 ms 
Verify Wintemitz signature 2.42 19.26 ms 
Initialise WinternitzShort object 0.72 0.72 ms 
Make WinternitzShort signature 8.28 58.28 ms 
Verify WinternitzShort signature 2.42 19.26 ms 
Make DSA signature 34.18 ms 
Verify DSA signature 40.36 ms 
Make RSA signature 67.8 ms 
Vfirifv RSA slanature 1.64 ms 
Table 6.3 
Time required making and verifying different signatures. 
Given the numbers in Table 6.2 and 6.3, we can find a relationship between the key 
times for the four types of signatures. These are given in Table 6.4. 
elementLen 
Winternitz initiate + sign 





WinternitzShort initiate + sign 

























































Relative numbers are given between the times required for signing and verification 
with class Winternitz, class WinternitzShort, DSA and RSA. 
Lines 3 through 6 in Table 6.4 are of special interest. We can see that a Wintemitz 
signature can be done 14 times faster than a DSA signature and 28 times faster than 
an RSA signature. Wintemitz verification is about 16 times faster than DSA 
verification, and even though it is slower than the RSA verification, it only takes 
about 50% longer. 
6.6.2 Size 
The size of the signatures depends not only on the size reduction factor represented by 
elementLen, but also on the size of the hash digests used, as each sub element is 
signed with one hash digest. This implementation uses SHA-1 which has digests of 
size 20 bytes. 
Below is a summary of the sizes of the variables used. The data types may vary with 
the platform and compiler used. The given sizes are for Windows 2000, Microsoft 
Visual C++. 
Data type Size 
byte* 1 bytes 
short unsigned int 2 bytes 
long int 4 bytes 
*byte is defined as unsigned char 
Table 6.5. 
Size of used data types on a PC running Windows 
2000, using Microsoft Visual C++. 
The value of the global constants listed in Table 6.6 decide the size of the private data 
members: 
Data member value 
elementLen 4 8 
SHA::DIGERSTSIZE 20 20 
elementLen 4 8 
elementPerByte 2 1 
checkLen 2 2 
Table 6.6 
The values of the global constants, deciding the 
size of the private arrays and matrices 
The tree major matrices (x, y and signature) all has the same size: 
{(SHA::DIGESTSIZE +checkLen)*elementPerByte)*SHA::DIGESTSIZE 
= ((20+2) * 2) * 20 = 880 bytes, for elementPerByte = 2 
= ((20+2) * 1) * 20 = 440 bytes, for elementPerByte = 1 
The matrix subvai's size: 
sizeof(short unsigned)*((SHA::DIGESTSIZE+checkLen)^elementPerByte) 
= 2 * ((20+2) * 2) = 8 8 bytes, for elementPerByte = 2 
= 2 * ((20+2) * 1) = 4 4 bytes, for elementPerByte = 1 
Given the data in Table 6.5 and 6.6 as well as the two formulas given above, we get 
the following memory requirements for the class winternitz and class 
win te rn i t z shor t , for both the signer and the verifier, with either 4 or 8 as the size 
reduction factor. 
Bytes stored by the signer Bytes stored by the verifier 
Standard Short Standard Short 
elementLen 4 8 4 8 4 8 4 8 
byte **x 880 440 
byte **y 880 440 880 440 880 440 
short unsigned int xyLen 2 2 2 2 
byte *subVal 88 44 88 44 88 44 
short unsigned int subLen 2 2 2 2 
byte *m 20 20 20 20 20 20 
short unsigned int mLen 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
short unsigned int n 2 2 2 2 
byte **signature 880 440 880 440 880 440 
long seed 4 4 
Total size 2756 1392 94 50 1876 952 1782 902 
Table 6.7: 
The number of bytes stored in the private members in class Wintemitz and class 
Winternitzshort. 
class Winternitzshort reduces the memory requirements while sacrificing 
computational time. It is a modified version of class winternitz, where most of the 
private data members are recomputed every time they are needed. The result is quite 
beneficial for the signer, as the storage requirements are reduced by a factor of about 
29. The verifier's storage requirements are reduced only marginally. 
6.6.3 Using different hashing algorithms 
Hashing is the operation that is done the most in the Wintemitz signature. SHA-1 has 
been chosen simply because it is the standard. 
Using MD5 for all hash operations offers advantages regarding both time and space. 
Depending on what operation we look at, using MD5 cuts down the required time to 
between 38% and 54% of what is needed while using SHA-1. The signing and 
verification speeds with class Winternitz and class WinternitzShort can thus 
be more then doubled. 
MD5 offers smaller signatures as well, since the digests are only 16 bytes as opposed 
to the 20 bytes digests of SHA-l. Signature sizes can be cut down to about 65% of the 
size while using SHA-l. 
6.6.4 A conclusion 
The relative times given in Table 6.4 has a good potential for time saving in payment 
systems with hash chains. 
Since class WinternitzShort offers virtually no size gain for the verifier, it is clear that 
only the signer should use this class. The signatures produces by the two classes are 
fully interchangeable, so the signer can use class WinternitzShort to sign, and the 
verifier can use class winternitz for verification. This allows for small storage 
requirements in small devices like smart cards, while the vendors with larger memory 
hardware can store more data. 
Both classes are optimised to the extreme, one for speed and the other for size. It is 
quite easy to make a combination, where the required storage will be less than for 
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Appendix A 
A series of time-data have been collected for operations relevant to the system in 
Chapter 5, Wintemitz signatures and implementations. Most of the work has been 
done on the authors MDA K-7, 600 MHz, but these tests have also been done on two 
more computers. The three hardware platforms the tests have been done on are: 
ADM K-7 Pentium 3 Laptop Celeron 
600 MHz 450 MHz 500 MHz 
128 MB RAM 128 MB RAM 60 MB RAM 
Running Windows 2000 Running Windows NT 4.0 Running Windows 98 
ADM K-7 
Rounds Time (ms) Op. per sec. 
Make SHA-1 digest 10000 70 142857.14 
Make SHA-1 digest 10000 70 142857.14 
Make SHA-1 digest 10000 60 166666.67 
Make SHA-1 digest 100000 691 144717.8 
Make SHA-1 digest 100000 691 144717.8 
Make SHA-1 digest 100000 691 144717.8 
Make SHA-1 digest 1000000 6950 143884.89 
Make SHA-1 digest 1000000 6920 144508.67 
Make SHA-1 digest 1000000 6910 144717.8 
Make SHA-1 digest 10000000 68829 145287.6 
Make SHA-1 digest 10000000 68799 145350.95 
Make SHA-1 digest 10000000 68869 145203.21 
Average 146290.62 
Make MD5 digest 10000 20 500000 
Make MD5 digest 10000 30 333333.33 
Make MD5 digest 10000 30 333333.33 
Make MD5 digest 100000 260 384615.38 
Make MD5 digest 100000 270 370370.37 
Make MD5 digest 100000 260 384615.38 
Make MD5 digest 1000000 2613 382701.88 
Make MD5 digest 1000000 2633 379794.91 
Make MD5 digest 1000000 2643 378357.93 
Make MD5 digest 10000000 26327 379838.19 
Make MD5 digest 10000000 26377 379118.17 
Make MD5 digest 10000000 26267 380705.83 
Average 
382232.06 
SHA-1 verification 10000 100 
100000 
SHA-1 verification 10000 100 
100000 









SHA "manual" verification 
SHA "manual" verification 
SHA "manual" verification 
SHA "manual" verification 
SHA "manual" verification 
SHA "manual" verification 
SHA "manual" verification 
SHA "manual" verification 
SHA "manual" verification 
Average 
Make DSA (1024) key pair 
Make DSA (1024) key pair 
Make DSA (1024) key pair 
Make DSA (1024) key pair 
Make DSA (1024) key pair 
Average 
Make RSA (1024) key pair 
Make RSA (1024) key pair 
Make RSA (1024) key pair 
Make RSA (1024) key pair 
Make RSA (1024) key pair 
Average 
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Average 
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 



































































































































Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 1000 40348 24.78 
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 1000 40237 24.85 
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 1000 40848 24.48 
Average 24.78 
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 1 70 14.29 
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 1 70 14.29 
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 1 70 14.29 
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 10 671 14.9 
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 10 661 15.13 
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 10 701 14.27 
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 100 6689 14.95 
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 100 6679 14.97 
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 100 6669 14.99 
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 1000 66696 14.99 
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 1000 66746 14.98 
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 1000 66756 14.98 
Average 14.75 
Verify RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 100 160 625 
Verify RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 100 160 625 
Verify RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 100 170 588.24 
Verify RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 1000 1652 605.33 
Verify RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 1000 1643 608.64 
Verify RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 1000 1653 604.96 
Average 609.53 
Seed a random pool 1000 310 3225.81 
Seed a random pool 1000 310 3225.81 
Seed a random pool 1000 290 3448.28 
Seed a random pool 10000 3014 3317.85 
Seed a random pool 10000 3014 3317.85 
Seed a random pool 10000 3034 3295.98 
Seed a random pool 100000 31154 3209.86 
Seed a random pool 100000 30463 3282.67 
Seed a random pool 100000 29893 3345.26 
Average 3296.6 
Seed a random pool and get a long seed 1000 694 1440.92 
Seed a random pool and get a long seed 1000 703 1422.48 
Seed a random pool and get a long seed 1000 721 1386.96 
Seed a random pool and get a long seed 10000 7030 1422.48 
Seed a random pool and get a long seed 10000 7057 1417.03 
Seed a random pool and get a long seed 10000 6986 1431.43 
Seed a random pool and get a long seed 100000 71230 1403.9 
Seed a random pool and get a long seed 100000 70491 1418.62 




Make random SHASIZE blocks= 1000 30 
33333.33 
Make random SHASIZE blocks= 1000 20 
50000 
Make random SHASIZE blocks= 1000 30 
33333.33 
Make random SHASIZE biocks= 10000 230 
43478.26 
Make random SHASIZE blocks= 10000 
240 41666.67 
Make random SHASIZE blocks= 







Make random SHASIZE blocks= 















Make subLen and checksum 
Make subLen and checksum 
Make subLen and checksum 
Make subLen and checksum 
Make subLen and checksum 
Make subLen and checksum 
Average 
elementLen=4 
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures 
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures 
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures 
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures 
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures 
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures 
Average 
Get (copy) the y matrixes 
Get (copy) the y matrixes 
Get (copy) the y matrixes 
Get (copy) the y matrixes 
Get (copy) the y matrixes 
Get (copy) the y matrixes 
Average 
Make empty Winternitz object 
Make empty Winternitz object 
Make empty Winternitz object 
Make empty Winternitz object 
Make empty Winternitz object 
Make empty Winternitz object 
Make empty Winternitz object 
Make empty Winternitz object 
Make empty Winternitz object 
Make empty Winternitz object 
Make empty Winternitz object 
Make empty Winternitz object 
Average 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 
















































1000 20 50000 
1000 30 33333.33 
1000 30 33333.33 
10000 221 45248.87 
10000 221 45248.87 
10000 220 45454.55 
42103.16 
1000 10 100000 
1000 10 100000 
1000 10 100000 
10000 120 83333.33 
10000 120 83333.33 
10000 120 83333.33 
91666.67 
10 70 142.86 
10 70 142.86 
10 60 166.67 
100 691 144.72 
100 691 144.72 
100 691 144.72 
1000 6869 145.58 
1000 6879 145.37 
1000 6869 145.58 
10000 68418 146.16 
10000 68418 146.16 
10000 68578 145.82 
146.77 
10 100 100 
10 90 111.11 
10 90 111.11 
100 931 107.41 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 100 981 101.94 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 100 1001 99.9 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 1000 9243 108.19 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 1000 9343 107.03 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 1000 9223 108.42 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 10000 92192 108.47 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 10000 97350 102.72 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 10000 96388 103.75 
Average 105.84 
Make Winternitz test object 1000 120 8333.33 
Make Winternitz test object 1000 110 9090.91 
Make Winternitz test object 1000 110 9090.91 
Make Winternitz test object 10000 1742 5740.53 
Make Winternitz test object 10000 1742 5740.53 
Make Winternitz test object 10000 1733 5770.34 
Average 7294.43 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 10 120 83.33 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 10 120 83.33 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 10 120 83.33 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 100 1182 84.6 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 100 1182 84.6 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 100 1232 81.17 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 1000 11867 84.27 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 1000 11878 84.19 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 1000 11867 84.27 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 10000 131139 76.25 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 10000 120864 82.74 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 10000 120974 82.66 
Average 82.9 
Update empty Winternitz signature 10 30 333.33 
Update empty Winternitz signature 10 20 500 
Update empty Winternitz signature 10 20 500 
Update empty Winternitz signature 100 250 400 
Update empty Winternitz signature 100 300 333.33 
Update empty Winternitz signature 100 300 333.33 
Update empty Winternitz signature 1000 2334 428.45 
Update empty Winternitz signature 1000 2444 409.17 
Update empty Winternitz signature 1000 2344 426.62 
Update empty Winternitz signature 10000 21351 468.36 
Update empty Winternitz signature 10000 26478 377.67 
Update empty Winternitz signature 10000 25437 393.13 
408.62 
Average 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 




























Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Average 
element Len=4 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Average 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Average 
Mai<e empty WinternitzShort object 
IVIake empty WinternitzShort object 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 
IVIake empty WinternitzShort object 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 
Average 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 
Average 
Update empty WinternitzShort object 
Update empty WinternitzShort object 
Update empty WinternitzShort object 
Update empty WinternitzShort object 
Update empty WinternitzShort object 
Update empty WinternitzShort object 
10000 28461 351.36 
10000 23303 429.13 
10000 24335 410.93 
418.36 
100 821 121.8 
100 861 116.14 
100 841 118.91 
1000 8813 113.47 
1000 8723 114.64 
1000 8603 116.24 
10000 84932 117.74 
10000 85874 116.45 
10000 86885 115.09 
116.72 
100 611 163.67 
100 621 161.03 
100 611 163.67 
1000 6138 162.92 
1000 6138 162.92 
1000 6148 162.65 
10000 61879 161.61 
10000 61728 162 
10000 61789 161.84 
162.48 
100 70 1428.57 
100 70 1428.57 
100 70 1428.57 
1000 701 1426.53 
1000 701 1426.53 
1000 701 1426.53 
10000 7020 1424.5 
10000 7010 1426.53 
10000 7060 1416.43 
1425.86 
100 70 1428.57 
100 70 1428.57 
100 80 1250 
1000 711 1406.47 
1000 711 1406.47 
1000 701 1426.53 
10000 7130 1402.52 
10000 7161 1396.45 
10000 7190 1390.82 
1392.93 
10000 90 111111.11 
10000 80 125000 
10000 90 111111.11 
100000 905 110497.24 
100000 910 109890.11 
100000 101 990099.01 
Average 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 
Average 
elementLen=8 
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures 
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures 
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures 
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures 
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures 
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures 
Average 
Get (copy) the y matrixes 
Get (copy) the y matrixes 
Get (copy) the y matrixes 
Get (copy) the y matrixes 
Get (copy) the y matrixes 
Get (copy) the y matrixes 
Average 
Make empty Winternitz object 
Make empty Winternitz object 
Make empty Winternitz object 
Make empty Winternitz object 
Make empty Winternitz object 
Make empty Winternitz object 
Make empty Winternitz object 
Make empty Winternitz object 
Make empty Winternitz object 
Average 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 
Average 
Make Winternitz test object 
Make Winternitz test object 
Make Winternitz test object 
Make Winternitz test object 
Make Winternitz test object 
259618.1 
100 290 344.83 
100 240 416.67 
100 260 384.62 
1000 2273 439.95 
1000 2373 421.41 
1000 2483 402.74 
10000 25807 387.49 
10000 24765 403.8 
10000 23704 421.87 
402.6 
10000 130 76923.08 
10000 130 76923.08 
10000 120 83333.33 
100000 1252 79872.2 
100000 1252 79872.2 
100000 1252 79872.2 
79466.02 
10000 70 142857.14 
10000 70 142857.14 
10000 70 142857.14 
100000 701 142653.35 
100000 701 142653.35 
100000 691 144717.8 
143099.32 
10 410 24.39 
10 400 25 
10 400 25 
100 4065 24.6 
100 4045 24.72 
100 4045 24.72 
1000 40488 24.7 
1000 40468 24.71 
1000 40388 24.76 
24.73 
10 630 15.87 
10 591 16.92 
10 581 17.21 
100 6049 16.53 
100 6409 15.6 
100 5869 17.04 
1000 62119 16.1 
1000 60347 16.57 
1000 56752 17.62 
16.61 
1000 60 16666.67 
1000 60 16666.67 
1000 61 16393.44 
10000 615 16260.16 
10000 608 16447.37 
Make Winternitz test object 
Average 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 
Average 
Update empty Winternitz signature 
Update empty Winternitz signature 
Update empty Winternitz signature 
Update empty Winternitz signature 
Update empty Winternitz signature 
Update empty Winternitz signature 
Update empty Winternitz signature 
Update empty Winternitz signature 
Update empty Winternitz signature 
Average 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Average 
element Len=8 
Get (produce) WinternitzSiiort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Average 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
10000 610 16393.44 
16471.29 
10 802 12.47 
10 801 12.48 
10 811 12.33 
100 8022 12.47 
100 7972 12.54 
100 7961 12.56 
1000 79905 12.51 
1000 79825 12.53 
1000 79764 12.54 
12.49 
10 211 47.39 
10 180 55.56 
10 180 55.56 
100 2003 49.93 
100 2374 42.12 
100 1833 54.56 
1000 21591 46.32 
1000 19888 50.28 
1000 16233 61.6 
51.48 
10 170 58.82 
10 210 47.62 
10 220 45.45 
100 1953 51.2 
100 1602 62.42 
100 2113 47.33 
1000 17716 56.45 
1000 19548 51.16 
1000 23003 43.47 
51.55 
10 581 17.21 
10 591 16.92 
10 601 16.64 
100 5998 16.67 
100 6179 16.18 
100 6359 15.73 
1000 59846 16.71 
1000 56431 17.72 
1000 56251 17.78 
16.84 
10 400 25 
10 400 25 
10 400 25 
100 4056 24.65 
100 4036 24.78 
100 4066 24.59 
1000 40468 24.71 
1000 40468 24.71 
Get (produce) y matrix 100( 40488 24.7 
Average 24.79 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 10C 70 1428.57 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 10C 70 1428.57 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 10C 60 1666.67 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 100C 701 1426.53 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 100C 701 1426.53 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 100C 691 1447.18 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 1000C ) 7108 1406.87 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 1000C 6911 1446.97 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 1000C 1 7058 1416.83 
Average 1454.97 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 100 80 1250 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 100 70 1428.57 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 100 70 1428.57 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 1000 711 1406.47 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 1000 711 1406.47 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 1000 701 1426.53 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 10000 7014 1425.72 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 10000 7119 1404.69 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 10000 7102 1408.05 
Average 1398.34 
Update empty WinternitzShort object 10000 40 250000 
Update empty WinternitzShort object 10000 40 250000 
Update empty WinternitzShort object 10000 40 250000 
Update empty WinternitzShort object 100000 421 237529.69 
Update empty WinternitzShort object 100000 440 227272.73 
Update empty WinternitzShort object 100000 401 249376.56 
Average 244029.83 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 10 220 45.45 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 10 210 47.62 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 10 200 50 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 100 1963 50.94 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 100 1792 55.8 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 100 1602 62.42 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 1000 19678 50.82 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 1000 23213 43.08 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 1000 23263 42.99 
Average 49.9 
Pentium 3 
Rounds Time (ms) Op. per sec. 
Make SHA-1 digest 10000 90 111111.11 
Make SHA-1 digest 10000 90 111111.11 
Make SHA-1 digest 10000 80 125000 
Make SHA-1 digest 100000 901 110987.79 
Make SHA-1 digest 100000 901 110987.79 
Make SHA-1 digest 100000 901 110987.79 
Make SHA-1 digest 1000000 8952 111706.88 
Make SHA-1 digest 1000000 8942 111831.8 
Make SHA-1 digest 1000000 8942 111831.8 
Make SHA-1 digest 10000000 89338 111934.45 
Make SHA-1 digest 10000000 89298 111984.59 
Make SHA-1 digest 10000000 89298 111984.59 
Average 112621.64 
Make MD5 digest 10000 30 333333.33 
Make MD5 digest 10000 30 333333.33 
Make MD5 digest 10000 40 250000 
Make MD5 digest 100000 310 322580.65 
Make MD5 digest 100000 310 322580.65 
Make MD5 digest 100000 310 322580.65 
Make MD5 digest 1000000 3105 322061.19 
Make MD5 digest 1000000 3105 322061.19 
Make MD5 digest 1000000 3105 322061.19 
Make MD5 digest 10000000 31025 322320.71 
Make MD5 digest 10000000 31035 322216.85 
Make MD5 digest 10000000 31025 322320.71 
Average 318120.87 
SHA-1 verification 10000 160 62500 
SHA-1 verification 10000 160 62500 
SHA-1 verification 10000 160 62500 
SHA-1 verification 100000 1633 61236.99 
SHA-1 verification 100000 1643 60864.27 
SHA-1 verification 100000 1633 61236.99 
SHA-1 verification 1000000 16323 61263.25 
SHA-1 verification 1000000 16323 61263.25 
SHA-1 verification 1000000 16323 61263.25 
Average 61625.33 
SHA "manual" verification 100000 20 5000000 
SHA "manual" verification 100000 20 5000000 
SHA "manual" verification 100000 10 10000000 
SHA "manual" verification 1000000 130 7692307.69 
SHA "manual" verification 1000000 130 7692307.69 
SHA "manual" verification 1000000 140 7142857.14 
SHA "manual" verification 10000000 1362 7342143.91 
SHA "manual" verification 10000000 1352 7396449.7 
SHA "manual" verification 10000000 1362 7342143.91 
Average 7178690 
Make DSA(1024) key pair 1 10.936 91.441 
Make DSA(1024) key pair 1 10.926 91.525 
Make DSA(1024) key pair 
Make DSA(1024) key pair 

























Make RSA (1024) key pair 
Make RSA (1024) key pair 
Make RSA (1024) key pair 






Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Average 
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Average 
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Average 
Verify RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Verify RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Verify RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Verify RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Verify RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Verify RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Verify RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Verify RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Verify RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Average 
Seed a random pool 
Seed a random pool 
Seed a random pool 
Seed a random pool 
Seed a random pool 
Seed a random pool 
Seed a random pool 
Seed a random pool 
Seed a random pool 
Average 
Seed a random pool and get a long seed 
10 420 23.81 
10 410 24.39 
10 410 24.39 
100 4136 24.18 
100 4126 24.24 
100 4146 24.12 
1000 41219 24.26 
1000 41299 24.21 
1000 41700 23.98 
24.18 
10 471 21.23 
10 481 20.79 
10 481 20.79 
100 4817 20.76 
100 4837 20.67 
100 4746 21.07 
1000 48500 20.62 
1000 46657 21.43 
1000 48299 20.7 
20.9 
10 811 12.33 
10 821 12.18 
10 821 12.18 
100 8181 12.22 
100 8181 12.22 
100 8172 12.24 
1000 81657 12.25 
1000 81668 12.24 
1000 81668 12.24 
12.23 
10 20 500 
10 20 500 
10 20 500 
100 201 497.51 
100 201 497.51 
100 211 473.93 
1000 1993 501.76 
1000 1992 502.01 
1000 1992 502.01 
497.19 
1000 22030 45.39 
1000 22030 45.39 
1000 21930 45.6 
10000 222310 44.98 
10000 222320 44.98 
10000 222720 44.9 
100000 2228500 44.87 
100000 2223790 44.97 
100000 2225800 44.93 
45.11 
1000 22730 43.99 
Seed a random pool and get a long seed 
Seed a random pool and get a long seed 
Seed a random pool and get a long seed 
Seed a random pool and get a long seed 
Seed a random pool and get a long seed 
Seed a random pool and get a long seed 
Seed a random pool and get a long seed 
Seed a random pool and get a long seed 
Average 
Make random SHASIZE biocks= 
Make random SHASIZE blocks= 
Make random SHASIZE blocks= 
Make random SHASIZE blocks= 
Make random SHASIZE blocks= 
Make random SHASIZE blocks= 
Average 
elementLen=4 
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures 
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures 
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures 
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures 
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures 
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures 
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures 
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures 
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures 
Average 
Get (copy) the y matrixes 
Get (copy) the y matrixes 
Get (copy) the y matrixes 
Get (copy) the y matrixes 
Get (copy) the y matrixes 
Get (copy) the y matrixes 
Average 
Make empty Winternitz object 
Make empty Winternitz object 
Make empty Winternitz object 
Make empty Winternitz object 
Make empty Winternitz object 
Make empty Winternitz object 
Make empty Winternitz object 
Make empty Winternitz object 
Make empty Winternitz object 
Average 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 
1000 22730 43.99 
1000 22830 43.8 
10000 227430 43.97 
10000 227920 43.88 
10000 227820 43.89 
100000 2278380 43.89 
100000 2274270 43.97 
100000 2276170 43.93 
43.92 
10000 300 33333.33 
10000 200 50000 
10000 300 33333.33 
100000 2800 35714.29 
100000 2910 34364.26 
100000 2900 34482.76 
24580.89 
1000 30 33333.33 
1000 30 33333.33 
1000 40 25000 
10000 260 38461.54 
10000 260 38461.54 
10000 270 37037.04 
100000 2673 37411.15 
100000 2673 37411.15 
100000 2673 37411.15 
35317.8 
1000 20 50000 
1000 20 50000 
1000 10 100000 
10000 150 66666.67 
10000 150 66666.67 
10000 140 71428.57 
67460.32 
10 310 32.26 
10 300 33.33 
10 310 32.26 
100 3054 32.74 
100 3054 32.74 
100 3054 32.74 
1000 30694 32.58 
1000 30674 32.6 
1000 30714 32.56 
32.65 
10 331 30.21 
10 331 30.21 
10 331 30.21 
100 3355 29.81 
100 3375 29.63 
100 3425 29.2 
1000 33439 29.91 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 
Average 
Make Winternitz test object 
Make Winternitz test object 
Make Winternitz test object 
Make Winternitz test object 
Make Winternitz test object 
Make Winternitz test object 
Make Winternitz test object 
Make Winternitz test object 
Make Winternitz test object 
Average 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 
Average 
Update empty Winternitz signature 
Update empty Winternitz signature 
Update empty Winternitz signature 
Update empty Winternitz signature 
Update empty Winternitz signature 
Update empty Winternitz signature 
Update empty Winternitz signature 
Update empty Winternitz signature 
Update empty Winternitz signature 
Average 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Average 
element Len=4 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
1000 33969 29.44 
1000 33849 29.54 
29.8 
1000 140 7142.86 
1000 140 7142.86 
1000 140 7142.86 
10000 1392 7183.91 
10000 1392 7183.91 
10000 1392 7183.91 
100000 15032 6652.47 
100000 15052 6643.64 
100000 15062 6639.22 
6990.63 
10 370 27.03 
10 370 27.03 
10 370 27.03 
100 3726 26.84 
100 3726 26.84 
100 3726 26.84 
1000 37173 26.9 
1000 37183 26.89 
1000 37403 26.74 
26.9 
10 30 333.33 
10 30 333.33 
10 30 333.33 
100 300 333.33 
100 300 333.33 
100 340 294.12 
1000 2603 384.17 
1000 3124 320.1 
1000 2994 334 
333.23 
10 40 250 
10 40 250 
10 40 250 
100 350 285.71 
100 340 294.12 
100 310 322.58 
1000 3806 262.74 
1000 3275 305.34 
1000 3675 272.11 
276.96 
10 111 90.09 
10 111 90.09 
10 111 90.09 
100 1041 96.06 
100 1061 94.25 
100 1061 94.25 
1000 10405 96.11 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Average 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Average 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 
Average 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 
Average 
Update empty WinternitzShort object 
Update empty WinternitzShort object 
Update empty WinternitzShort object 
Update empty WinternitzShort object 
Update empty WinternitzShort object 
Update empty WinternitzShort object 
Average 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 
Average 
elementLen=8 
1000 10135 98.67 
1000 10546 94.82 
93.83 
10 80 125 
10 80 125 
10 80 125 
100 771 129.7 
100 781 128.04 
100 781 128.04 
1000 7781 128.52 
1000 7791 128.35 
1000 7781 128.52 
127.35 
10 220 45.45 
10 220 45.45 
10 220 45.45 
100 2263 44.19 
100 2263 44.19 
100 2263 44.19 
1000 22782 43.89 
1000 22772 43.91 
1000 22822 43.82 
44.5 
10 230 43.48 
10 220 45.45 
10 230 43.48 
100 2253 44.39 
100 2263 44.19 
100 2263 44.19 
1000 22853 43.76 
1000 22863 43.74 
1000 22863 43.74 
44.05 
1000 10 100000 
1000 10 100000 
1000 10 100000 
10000 100 100000 
10000 90 111111.11 
10000 100 100000 
101851.85 
10 30 333.33 
10 30 333.33 
10 30 333.33 
100 381 262.47 
100 341 293.26 
100 351 284.9 
1000 3676 272.03 
1000 3946 253.42 
1000 3535 282.89 
294.33 
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures 10000 130 76923.08 
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures 10000 130 76923.08 
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures 10000 140 71428.57 
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures 100000 1342 74515.65 
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures 100000 1342 74515.65 
Get (copy) the Winternitz signatures 100000 1342 74515.65 
Average 74803.61 
Get (copy) the y matrixes 10000 80 125000 
Get (copy) the y matrixes 10000 80 125000 
Get (copy) the y matrixes 10000 70 142857.14 
Get (copy) the y matrixes 100000 751 133155.79 
Get (copy) the y matrixes 100000 751 133155.79 
Get (copy) the y matrixes 100000 761 131406.04 
Average 131762.46 
Make empty Winternitz object 10 781 12.8 
Make empty Winternitz object 10 741 13.5 
Make empty Winternitz object 10 751 13.32 
Make empty Winternitz object 100 7430 13.46 
Make empty Winternitz object 100 7420 13.48 
Make empty Winternitz object 100 7400 13.51 
Make empty Winternitz object 1000 75037 13.33 
Make empty Winternitz object 1000 73896 13.53 
Make empty Winternitz object 1000 74598 13.41 
Average 13.37 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 10 1022 9.78 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 10 971 10.3 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 10 1032 9.69 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 100 9734 10.27 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 100 10255 9.75 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 100 10876 9.19 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 1000 97089 10.3 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 1000 99332 10.07 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 1000 98254 10.18 
9.95 Average 
Make Winternitz test object 1000 70 14285.71 
Make Winternitz test object 1000 80 12500 
Make Winternitz test object 1000 70 14285.71 
Make Winternitz test object 10000 721 13869.63 
Make Winternitz test object 10000 721 13869.63 
Make Winternitz test object 10000 731 13679.89 
Make Winternitz test object 100000 7821 
12786.09 
Make Winternitz test object 100000 7791 
12835.32 


















Make/self verity Winternitz signature 10 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 10 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 





Make/self verity Winternitz signature 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 
Average 
Update empty Winternitz signature 
Update empty Winternitz signature 
Update empty Winternitz signature 
Update empty Winternitz signature 
Update empty Winternitz signature 
Update empty Winternitz signature 
Update empty Winternitz signature 
Update empty Winternitz signature 
Update empty Winternitz signature 
Average 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Average 
element Len=8 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Average 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Average 
iVIake empty WinternitzShort object 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 













































































































































Make empty WinternitzShort object 1000C 1 22872 437.22 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 10000 1 22862 437.41 
Average 436.46 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 100 1 230 434.78 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 100 230 434.78 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 100 230 434.78 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 1000 2303 434.22 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 1000 2293 436.11 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 1000 2293 436.11 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 10000 22903 436.62 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 10000 22913 436.43 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 10000 22913 436.43 
Average 435.58 
Update empty WinternitzShort object 10000 40 250000 
Update empty WinternitzShort object 10000 50 200000 
Update empty WinternitzShort object 10000 40 250000 
Update empty WinternitzShort object 100000 480 208333.33 
Update empty WinternitzShort object 100000 520 192307.69 
Update empty WinternitzShort object 100000 490 204081.63 
Average 217453.78 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 10 301 33.22 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 10 231 43.29 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 10 271 36.9 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 100 2704 36.98 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 100 2264 44.17 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 100 2484 40.26 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 1000 29372 34.05 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 1000 22612 44.22 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 1000 27129 36.86 
Average 38.88 
Celeron 
Rounds Time (ms) Op. per sec. 
Make SHA-1 digest 10000 160 62500 
Make SHA-1 digest 10000 170 58823.53 
Make SHA-1 digest 10000 110 90909.09 
Make SHA-1 digest 100000 1320 75757.58 
Make SHA-1 digest 100000 1320 75757.58 
Make SHA-1 digest 100000 1370 72992.7 
Make SHA-1 digest 1000000 9170 109051.25 
Make SHA-1 digest 1000000 9220 108459.87 
Make SHA-1 digest 1000000 9230 108342.36 
Make SHA-1 digest 10000000 87770 113934.15 
Make SHA-1 digest 10000000 87780 113921.17 
Make SHA-1 digest 10000000 87770 113934.15 
Average 92031.95 
Make MD5 digest 10000 60 166666.67 
Make MD5 digest 10000 50 200000 
Make MD5 digest 10000 60 
166666.67 
Make MD5 digest 100000 270 
370370.37 
Make MD5 digest 
Make MD5 digest 
Make MD5 digest 
Make MD5 digest 
Make MD5 digest 
Make MD5 digest 
Make MD5 digest 












SHA "manual" verification 
SHA "manual" verification 
SHA "manual" verification 
SHA "manual" verification 
SHA "manual" verification 
SHA "manual" verification 
SHA "manual" verification 
SHA "manual" verification 
SHA "manual" verification 
Average 
Make DSA (1024) key pair 
Make DSA (1024) key pair 
Make DSA (1024) key pair 
Make DSA (1024) key pair 
Make DSA (1024) key pair 
Average 
Make RSA (1024) key pair 
Make RSA (1024) key pair 
Make RSA (1024) key pair 
Make RSA (1024) key pair 
Make RSA (1024) key pair 
Average 
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 
Make DSA siganture on a SHA-1 











100000 270 370370.37 
100000 330 303030.3 
1000000 3020 331125.83 
1000000 3020 331125.83 
1000000 3020 331125.83 
10000000 30100 332225.91 
10000000 30100 332225.91 
10000000 30100 332225.91 
297263.3 
100000 1430 69930.07 
100000 1430 69930.07 
100000 1370 72992.7 
1000000 14010 71377.59 
1000000 14010 71377.59 
1000000 13950 71684.59 
10000000 139900 71479.63 
10000000 139840 71510.3 
10000000 139780 71540.99 
71313.73 
100000 110 909090.91 
100000 110 909090.91 
100000 170 588235.29 
1000000 1370 729927.01 
1000000 1370 729927.01 
1000000 1320 757575.76 
10000000 13290 752445.45 
10000000 13230 755857.9 














10 770 12.99 
10 770 12.99 
10 770 12.99 
100 4390 22.78 
100 4450 22.47 
100 4450 22.47 
1000 40650 24.6 
1000 40700 24.57 
1000 40700 24.57 
20.05 
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Verify DSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Average 
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Make RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Average 
Verify RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Verify RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Verify RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Verify RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Verify RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Verify RSA siganture on a SHA-1 digest 
Average 
Seed a random pool 
Seed a random pool 
Seed a random pool 
Seed a random pool 
Seed a random pool 
Seed a random pool 
Seed a random pool 
Seed a random pool 
Seed a random pool 
Average 
Seed a random pool and get a long seed 
Seed a random pool and get a long seed 
Seed a random pool and get a long seed 
Seed a random pool and get a long seed 
Seed a random pool and get a long seed 
Seed a random pool and get a long seed 
Seed a random pool and get a long seed 
Seed a random pool and get a long seed 
Seed a random pool and get a long seed 
Average 
Make random SHASIZE blocks= 
Make random SHASIZE blocks= 
Make random SHASIZE bIocks= 
















































































































































Make random SHASIZE blocks= 10000 589 16977.93 
Make random SHASIZE blocks= 10000 573 17452.01 
Average 11572.97 
elementLen=4 
Make empty Winternitz object 10 820 12.2 
Make empty Winternitz object 10 770 12.99 
Make empty Winternitz object 10 820 12.2 
Make empty Winternitz object 100 5110 19.57 
Make empty Winternitz object 100 5170 19.34 
Make empty Winternitz object 100 5110 19.57 
Make empty Winternitz object 1000 48770 20.5 
Make empty Winternitz object 1000 48770 20.5 
Make empty Winternitz object 1000 48660 20.55 
Average 17.49 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 10 490 20.41 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 10 610 16.39 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 10 550 18.18 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 100 5000 20 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 100 5050 19.8 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 100 4940 20.24 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 1000 55420 18.04 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 1000 54810 18.24 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 1000 55200 18.12 
Average 18.82 
Make Winternitz test object 100 50 2000 
Make Winternitz test object 100 60 1666.67 
Make Winternitz test object 100 50 2000 
Make Winternitz test object 1000 170 5882.35 
Make Winternitz test object 1000 110 9090.91 




Make/self verity Winternitz signature 10 18.18 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 10 550 18.18 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 10 550 18.18 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 100 5380 18.59 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 100 5390 18.55 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 100 5380 18.59 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 1000 60970 16.4 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 1000 61020 16.39 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 1000 60970 16.4 
17.72 Average 



















Update empty Winternitz signature 10 
Update empty Winternitz signature 10 






Update empty Winternitz signature 
Update empty Winternitz signature 
Update empty Winternitz signature 
Update empty Winternitz signature 
Update empty Winternitz signature 
Average 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Average 
element Len=4 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Average 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Average 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 
Average 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 
Average 
10 40 250 
10 50 200 
10 30 333.33 
100 330 303.03 
100 270 370.37 
100 390 256.41 
1000 3080 324.68 
1000 3570 280.11 
1000 3520 284.09 
289.11 
10 110 90.91 
10 60 166.67 
10 110 90.91 
100 1040 96.15 
100 1050 95.24 
100 1050 95.24 
1000 11370 87.95 
1000 10380 96.34 
1000 10490 95.33 
101.64 
10 50 200 
10 110 90.91 
10 110 90.91 
100 770 129.87 
100 770 129.87 
100 770 129.87 
1000 7800 128.21 
1000 7690 130.04 
1000 7640 130.89 
128.95 
10 660 15.15 
10 600 16.67 
10 610 16.39 
100 4340 23.04 
100 4290 23.31 
100 4290 23.31 
1000 40750 24.54 
1000 40100 24.94 
1000 40150 24.91 
21.36 
10 550 18.18 
10 600 16.67 
10 550 18.18 
100 3850 25.97 
100 3840 26.04 
100 3850 25.97 
1000 43440 23.02 
1000 42790 23.37 
1000 42730 23.4 
22.31 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 
Average 
elementLen=8 
Make empty Winternitz object 
Make empty Winternitz object 
Make empty Winternitz object 
Make empty Winternitz object 
Make empty Winternitz object 
Make empty Winternitz object 
Make empty Winternitz object 
Make empty Winternitz object 
Make empty Winternitz object 
Average 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 
Make Winternitz object (inc. signature) 
Average 
Make Winternitz test object 
Make Winternitz test object 
Make Winternitz test object 
Make Winternitz test object 
Make Winternitz test object 
Make Winternitz test object 
Average 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 
Make/self verity Winternitz signature 
Average 
Update empty Winternitz signature 
Update empty Winternitz signature 
Update empty Winternitz signature 
Update empty Winternitz signature 
Update empty Winternitz signature 













































































































































Update empty Winternitz signature 
Update empty Winternitz signature 
Update empty Winternitz signature 
Average 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Verity Winternitz signature 
Average 
element Len=8 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Get (produce) WinternitzShort signature 
Average 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Get (produce) y matrix 
Average 
iVIake empty WinternitzShort object 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 
Make empty WinternitzShort object 
Average 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 
Make WintemitzShort signature object 
Make WintemitzShort signature object 
Make WintemitzShort signature object 
Make WintemitzShort signature object 
Make WintemitzShort signature object 
1000 27020 37.01 
1000 26970 37.08 
1000 20320 49.21 
40.83 
10 280 35.71 
10 170 58.82 
10 270 37.04 
100 2690 37.17 
100 2630 38.02 
100 2410 41.49 
1000 22130 45.19 
1000 28780 34.75 
1000 26854 37.24 
40.6 
10 720 13.89 
10 720 13.89 
10 770 12.99 
100 7420 13.48 
100 7640 13.09 
100 7250 13.79 
1000 74860 13.36 
1000 74430 13.44 
1000 74970 13.34 
13.47 
10 490 20.41 
10 490 20.41 
10 490 20.41 
100 4990 20.04 
100 5000 20 
100 4990 20.04 
1000 49930 20.03 
1000 49870 20.05 
1000 49870 20.05 
20.16 
100 770 129.87 
100 600 166.67 
100 720 138.89 
1000 4340 230.41 
1000 4280 233.64 
1000 4400 227.27 
10000 40320 248.02 
10000 40210 248.69 
10000 40150 249.07 
208.06 
100 490 204.08 
100 600 166.67 
100 550 181.82 
1000 3900 256.41 
1000 3900 256.41 
1000 3890 257.07 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 10000 42890 233.15 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 10000 42460 235.52 
Make WinternitzShort signature object 10000 42790 233.7 
Average 224.98 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 10 270 37.04 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 10 270 37.04 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 10 220 45.45 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 100 2420 41.32 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 100 2250 44.44 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 100 2640 37.88 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 1000 24280 41.19 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 1000 24220 41.29 
Verity WinternitzShort signature 1000 24280 41.19 
Average 40.76 
Appendix B 
Table 6.2 presented times for how long it takes to do some of the operations involved 
with making winternitz and winternitzshort signatures. Those times, as well as 
the ones on the left hand side of these tables were taken from individual smaller tests. 
They are based on timing for producing hash chains (simply repeated hashing), 
generate random numbers and do a few other calculations. This was done to see 
where the most time was spent, and thus provide more detailed and vital data. 
The values on the right hand side in these two tables are taken from tests run on the 
winternitz and winternitzShort classes. They are all fraction slower then the ones 








































Table B.l ^ ^ , 
Detailed time for each sub operation done m class winternitz versus the actual 
times required to do the actual class winternitz operations 
I l l 
elementLen 
Short Winternitz 
4 8 4 8 




































Detailed time for each sub operation done in class winternitzshort versus the 
actual times required to do the actual class winternitzshort operations 
Appendix C 
class Winternitz 
/ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
*winternitz.h 
*Done as a part of the thesis: "Aspects of Micropayments" by Terje 
*Tollisen for his Master of Science (Honours) at University of 
*Wollongong. 






/*Each element to be signed with a hash value. 4 means that each byte 
will be divivde into 2*/. 
const short unsigned int elementLen=4; 
//Nubmer og elements per byte that must be signed with a hash value 
cons't short unsigned int elementPerByte=2 ; 
/•Maximum number of bytes needed for the checksum = 
2^elementLen*elementPerByte*digestLen 
=2^8*1*160=40960 and takes less then 16 bits 
(in binary= 10100000 00000000) 
=2^4*2*160=5120 and takes less then 16 bits 
(in binary= 00010100 00000000) 
*/ 
const short unsigned int checkLen=sizeof(short unsigned); 
const short unsigned int digestLen=SHA::DIGESTSIZE; 
class Winternitz { 
public: 
//Makes a signature object with the x and y values. 
Winternitz(); 
-Winternitz(); 
//Makes a signature object, and creates a signature on 
the 
//message messDigest 
Winternitz(byte messDigest[], short unsigned int 
messDigestLen); 
//Produce a signature object used for tesing a signature 
Winternitz(byte messDigest[], short unsigned int 
messDigestLen, byte **yTest); 
//Assigns a message to a defined Winternitz object 
bool update(byte messDigest[], short unsigned int 
messDigestLen); 
//Returns the length of the x and y matrices 
short unsigned getxyLen(){return xyLen;} 
//Returns the object's public y matrix 
bool getY(byte ** yTemp); 
//Returns the public parts of the signature 
bool getSignature(byte **sign, byte **yTemp); 
//Test function. Verifying the objects own signature 
short verifySignature(); 
//Tests if the given signature is valid on the object's 
message 
short verifySignature(byte ** testSign); 
private: 
//Creates the x and y matrices 
void initialize 0; 
void computeSubVal()/ 
//Make the checksum for the siganture 
void makeCheckSum(); 
//Splits a byte into wo bytes, adding 0's as padding 
void splitByte(const byte val, byte * splitArray)/ 
void produceXO ; 
void produceYO ; 
//Makes the signature 
void produceSignature() ; 
byte **x; 
byte **y/ 
short unsigned int xyLen; 
byte *subVal; 
short unsigned int subLen; 
byte *m; 
short unsigned int mLen; 




*Done as a part of the thesis: "Aspects of Micropayments" by Terje 











short unsigned i=0;//counter 
if(x!=NULL) { 
for(i=0; i<xyLen; i++) 
delete [] x[i]; 
delete [] x; } 
if{yl=NULL) { 
for(i=0; i<xyLen; i++) 
delete [] y[i]; 
delete [] y; 
} 
if(subVal!=NULL) 
delete [] subVal; 
if (signature!=NULL) { 
for(i=0; i<subLen; i++) 
delete [] signature[i]; 
delete [] signature; 
} } 
//messDigest is assumed to be a SHA digest 





for(short unsigned int i=0; i<mLen; i++) 
m[i]=messDigest[i]; 
n = pow(2,elementLen)///A sub element has a values less then n. 
//Split the bytes in m into shorter elements. Used to find 
//number of hashes needed for signing 
subLen=(digestLen+checkLen)*elementPerByte; 
xyLen=subLen; 
//Long enough to hold the digest plus checksum 






//Produce a signature object used for tesing a signature 
//No X and y matrices are made. ^ . ̂  
Winternitz::Winternitz (byte messDigest[], short unsigned int 
messDigestLen, byte **yTest) { 
//Initialize m 
mLen=messDigestLen; 
m=new byte[mLen]; _ 
for(short unsigned int i=0; i<mLen; i++) 
m[i]=messDigest[i]; 
n = pow(2,elementLen)///A sub element has a values less then n 
subLen=(mLen+checkLen)*elementPerByte/ 
xyLen=subLen; 
//Long enough to hold the digest plus checksum 
subVal = new byte [subLen]; 
computeSubVal0///Computes the sub elements in the digest, 
makeChecksum(); 
x=NULL///x is not used in a test object 
signature=NULL;//signature is not used in a test object 
//Allocate memory for y 
y = new byte *[xyLen]; 
for(short unsigned int k=0; k<subLen; k++) 
{ 
y[k] = new byte[SHA:iDIGESTSIZE] ; 
forishort unsigned int j=0; j<SHA:rDIGESTSIZE; j++) 






n = pow(2,elementLen);//A sub element has a values less then n. 
xyLen=(digestLen+checkLen)*elementPerByte; 
subVal=NULL;//The message to sign has not been given yet 




//Makes the sub elements in subVal. See Witnernitz descriptions in 
//chapter 4 for details 
void Winternitz::computeSubVal() 
{ 
short unsigned i///loop counter 
if(elementPerByte==l) 
for(i=0; i<mLen; i++) 
subVal[i]=m[i]; 
else 
for(i=0; i<mLen; i++) 
splitByte(m[i],SsubVal[i*elementPerByte]); 
} 
//Creates the check sum for the siganture. See Chapter 4 for details 
//This check sum will be appended to subVal 
void Winternitz:rmakeCheckSum() 
short unsigned c=0;//the integer value of the checksum 
short unsigned int i=0;//loop counter 
int j=0;//loop counter 
short unsigned cLen=checkLen; 
//The binary representation of the check sum c 
byte * cVal = new byte[checkLen]/ 
//Compute the check sum 
for(i=0; i<subLen-(checkLen*elementPerByte); i++) 
c+=(n-subVal[i]); 
for(i=0/ i<cLen; i++) 
cVal[i]=0; 
//casts the integer check sum, c, into a byte array, cVal. 
cVal=(byte*)&c; 
int tempVal=subLen-checkLen*elementPerByte/ 
short unsigned int k=cLen-l;//Last index of cVal 
if(elementPerByte==l)//cVal can be copied straight into subVal 
//Put cVal into the last indexes of subVal 
for(j=tempVal; j<subLen; j++) 
subVal[j]=cVal[k--] ; 
else//byte's in check sura must split like the elements in 
subVal 
//Put cVal into the last indexes of subVal 
for(j=tempVal; j<subLen; j+=2) 
splitByte(cVal[k--], &subVal[j]); 
} 
//Splits a byte into an array of bytes, padding the high order bits 
//with 0 
void Winternitz::splitByte(const byte val, byte * splitArray) 
( //The mask starts out with one 1, and seven O's: mask=1000000 
byte mask = 12 8; 
//Once for each element in splitArray 
for(short unsigned int i=0; i<elementPerByte; i++) { 
splitArray[i]=0; 
for(short unsigned int j=0; j<elementLen; j++) { 
splitArray[i]<<=1; 
if(val & mask)//Push 1, else push 0 
splitArray[i]=splitArray[i] |l; 
mask>>=l; } } } 
//Generates a matrix of ramdom numbers. 
//These are the secret x values. 
//Each X is set to the same length as a SHA digest, 
void Winternitz::produceX0 
short unsigned i;//loop counter 
//Allocate memory for the x matrix 
X = new byte *[xyLen]; 
for(i = 0; i < xyLen; i++) 
x[i] = new byte[SHA::DIGESTSIZE]; 
//Create a secret seed 
AutoSeededRandomPool rng/ 
long seed=rng.GetLong(); 
//Create the x matrix from the seed 
//using a pseudorandom function 
RandomPool randPool; 
randPool.Put((byte*)&seed, sizeof(seed)); 
for(i=0; i<xyLen; i++) randPool.GenerateBlock(X[i], SHA::DIGESTSIZE); 
//Generates a matrix with public y values. 
//Each y is a SHA (multiple) digest of the corresponding x. 
void Winternitz::produceY() { 
short unsigned i, j;//loop counters 
//Allocate memory for the y matrix 
y = new byte *[xyLen]; 
for(i = 0 ; i < xyLen; i++) 
y[i] = new byte[SHA::DIGESTSIZE] ; 
//Each x[i] is hashed n times to produce y[i] 
SHA hash; 
for(i=0; i<xyLen; i++) { 
hash.CalculateDigest (y [i] , x[i], SHA: :DIGESTSIZE) ,• 
for(j=l; j<n; j++) 
hash.CalculateDigest(y[i], y[i], SHA::DIGESTSIZE); 
} ) 
//Creating the signature involves hashing each x[i] 
//as many times as the value in subVal[i]. 
//The result is stored in signature[i] 
void Winternitz::produceSignature() { 
short unsigned i, j, k;//loop conters 
//Allocate memory for the signature matrix 
signature = new byte *[subLen]; 
for(i =0; i < subLen; i++) 
signature [i] = new byte[SHA::DIGESTSIZE] ; 
//Create the signature 
SHA hash; 
for(i=0; i<subLen; i++)//Once for each x (and y and subVal) 
^ //The x[i] is hashed subVal[i] times and 
//put into signature[i] 
if(subVal[i]>0) 
^ hash.CalculateDigest(signature[i] , x[i], 
SHA::DIGESTSIZE); 
//j=0 have been done on the line above 
for(j=l; j<subVal[i]; j++) hash.CalculateDigest(signature[i], 
signature [i], SHA: :DIGESTSIZE) ; 
//subVal[i] can be 0 in the check sum. x[i] is just 
//copied into signature[i] 
else 
for(k=0; k<SHA::DIGESTSIZE; k++) 
signature [i] [k]=x[i] [k] ; } } 
///////////tMnctions////////////////////// 
//Assigns a message to sign to an object. This should only be 
//done with an object made with the default constructor. It should 
//also only be done once per object for security reasons, 
bool Winternitz::update(byte messDigest[], short unsigned int 
messDigestLen) { 
//Security check 
//Comment out if several updates must be called to 
// time the operations 





for(short unsigned int i=0; i<mLen; i++) 
m[i]=messDigest[i] ; 
//Split the bytes in m into shorter elements. 
// Used to find number of hashes needed for signing 
subLen=(digestLen+checkLen)*elementPerByte; 
xyLen=subLen; 
//Long enough to hold the digest pluss checksum 
subVal = new byte [subLen]; 
computeSubVal0///Computes the sub values in the digest. 
makeCheckSum(); 
producesignature(); 
return true; } 
//Copies the private y-matrix into the argument yTemp 
bool Winternitz::getY(byte ** yTemp) { 
if(!y) 
return false; 
short unsigned i, j;//loop counters 
for(i=0; i<xyLen; i++) 
for(j=0; j<SHA::DIGESTSIZE; j++) 
yTemp [i] [j] =y[i] [j] ; 
return true; 
} 
//The public parts of the siganture (the y and signature matrices) 
//are copied into the argumnts. 
//Returns false if no siganture exits, and true otherwise 





short unsigned i, j;//loop counters 
for(i=0; i<subLen; i++) _ for(j =0; j<SHA::DIGESTSIZE; ]++) 
^ sign[i][j]=signature[i][j]; 
yTemp[iJ [j]=y[i] [j 1 ; } ^ return true; 
//A test function that tests the signature of the signtureobject 






unsigned short i, j, k, t;//loop counters 
SHA hash; 
for(i=0; i<subLen; i++)//Once for each hash value { 




//Hash the test siganture as many times as subVal[i] 
for(j=subVal[i]; j<n; j++) 
hash.CalculateDigest(tempCheck, tempCheck, 
SHA::DIGESTSIZE); 
//It is faster to check the digest "manually" rather 
//then calling hash.VerifyDigest() 
//Test is the test signature is equal to y 
for(t=0; t<SHA:iDIGESTSIZE; t++) 




//Tests if the recieved signature is a valid one for the 
//signatureobject. Returns -1 if the test cannot be done, 
//O if the test fails and 1 otherwise 





byte tempCheck[SHA:rDIGESTSIZE] ; 
unsigned short i, j, k, t;//loop counters 
SHA hash; 
for(i=0; i<subLen; i++)//Once for each hash value 
^ for(k=0; k<SHA::DIGESTSIZE; k++)//Copy the siganture to test tempCheck[k]=testSign[i][k]; 
//Hash the test siganture as many times as subVal[i] 
for(j=subVal[i]; j<n; j++) 
hash.CalculateDigest(tempCheck, tempCheck, 
SHA::DIGESTSIZE); 
//It is fater to check the digests "manually" 
//rather then calling hash.VerifyDigest() 
//Test is the test siganture is equal to y 
for(t=0; t<SHA::DIGESTSIZE; t++) 
if(y[i] [t] !=tempCheck [t]) 
^ return 0; 
^ return 1; 
class WinternitzShort 
*winternitzShort.h 
*Done as a part of the thesis: "Aspects of Micropayments" by Terje 
*Tollisen for his Master of Science (Honours) at University of 
*Wollongong. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
#ifndef winterntitzshort_h 
#define winterntitzshort_h 






//Makes a signature object with the x and y values. 
WinternitzShort(); 
-WinternitzShort() ; 
//Makes a signature object, and creates a signature on 
//the message messDigest 
WinternitzShort(byte messDigest[], short unsigned int 
messDigestLen); 
//Assigns a message to a defined WinternitzShort object 
b o o l update(byte messDigest[], short unsigned int 
messDigestLen); 
//Returns the length of the x and y matrices 
short unsigned getxyLen()(return xyLen;} 
//Returns the object's public y matrix 
void getY(byte ** yTemp); 
//Returns the public parts of the signature 
b o o l getSignature(byte **sign, byte **yTemp); 
//Tests if the given siganture is valid on 
//the object's message 
short verifySignature(byte ** testSign); 
//Tests if the given siganture is valid on 
//the object's message 
short verifySignature(byte ** testSign, byte ** testY)/ 
//Tests if the given siganture is valid on 
//given message 
short verifySignature(byte messDigest[], byte ** 
testSign, 
byte ** testY); 
private: 
void computeSubVal(byte m[]); 
v o i d splitByte(const byte val, byte * splitArray); 
v o i d makeCheckSum(); 
void produceX(byte ** xTemp); 
#endif 
void produceY(byte ** yTemp); 
//To avoid making the x matrix several times 
void produceY(byte ** yTemp, byte ** x)/ 
//Makes the signature 
bool produceSignature(byte ** signTemp); 
//To avoid making the x matrix several times 
bool produceSignature(byte ** signTemp, byte ** x); 
long seed;//Secret seed that the x-matrix is based on 
short unsigned int xyLen; 
byte *subVal; 
/**************************************************** *winternitzShort.cpp 
*Done as a part of the thesis: "Aspects of Mierepayments" by Terje 















delete [] subVal; 
} 
//messDigest is assumed to be a SHA digest 
Winternitzshort::Winternitzshort(byte messDigest[] , short unsigned 
messDigestLen) 
//Make the random seed 
AutoSeededRandomPool rng; 
seed=rng.GetLong(); 
xyLen= (digestLen+checkLen) *elementPerByte; 
//Long enough to hold the digest plus checksum 
subVal = new byte [xyLen]; 
//Computes the sub values in the digest. 
computeSubVal(messDigest); makeCheckSum(); 
////////////tMnctions//////////////////// 
//Makes the sub elements in subVal. See Witnernitz 
//descriptions in Chapter 4 for details 
void WinternitzShort::computeSubVal(byte m[]) { 
short unsigned n = pow(2,elementLen); 
short unsigned subLen=(digestLen+checkLen)*elementPerByte/ 
short unsigned i;//loop counter 
if(elementPerByte==l) 
for(i=0; i<SHA:iDIGESTSIZE; i++) 
subVal[i]=m[i]; 
else 
for(i=0; i<SHA::DIGESTSIZE; i++) 
splitByte(m[i], 
ScSubVal [i*elementPerByte] ) ;//2==elementPerByte 
} 
//Creates the check sum for the siganture. See Chapter 4 for details 
//This check sum will be appended to subVal 
void WinternitzShort::makeCheckSum() { 
//Find the value of the check sum that will 
//be appended to subVal 
short unsigned c=0;//the integer value of the checksum 
short unsigned int i=0;//counter 
short unsigned cLen=checkLen; 
//The binary reprensentation of the check sum c 
byte * cVal = new byte[checkLen]; 
int n=pow(2,elementLen); 
//Compute the check sum 
for(i=0; i<xyLen-(checkLen*elementPerByte); i++) 
c+=(n-subVal[i]); 
for(i=0; i<cLen/ i++) 
cVal[i]=0; 
//casts the integer check sum, c, into a byte array, cVal. 
cVal= (byte*) 6cC; 
int tempVal = xyLen-checkLen*elementPerByte; 
short unsigned int k=cLen-l;//Last index of cVal 
if(elementPerByte==l)//cVal can be copied straight into subVal 
//Put cVal into the last indexes of subVal 
for(int j= tempVal; j<xyLen; j++) 
subVal[j]=cVal[k--]; 
else//bytes the check sum must split like the elements in 
//Put cVal into the last indexes of subVal 
for(int j= tempVal; j<xyLen; j+=2) 
splitByte (cVal [k--] , ScSubVal [j] ) ; 
} 
//Splits a byte into an array of bytes, padding the high 
//order bits with 0 
void WinternitzShort:rsplitByte(const byte val, byte * splitArray) 
//The mask starts out with one 1, and seven O's: mask=1000000 
byte mask = 12 8; 
//Once for each element in splitArray 
for(short unsigned int i=0; i<elementPerByte; i++) 
splitArray[i]=0; 
for(short unsigned int j=0/ j<elementLen; j++) 
splitArray[i]<<=1; 
if(val & mask)//Push 1, else push 0 
splitArray[i]=splitArray[i]|l; 
mask>>=l; } } } 
//Generates a matrix of ramdom numbers. These are the 
//secret x values.Each x is set to the same length as a SHA digest. 
void WinternitzShort:rproduceX(byte ** xTemp) { 
//Make the x values form the private seed 
RandomPool randPool; 
randPool.Put((byte*) ficseed, sizeof(seed))/ 
for(short unsigned int j=0; j<xyLen; j++) 
randPool.GenerateBlock(xTemp[j], SHA::DIGESTSIZE); 
//Generates the public y matrix and puts it in the argument yTemp 
//Each y is a SHA digest of the corresponding x. 
void WinternitzShort:rproduceY(byte ** yTemp) { 
short unsigned int i, j///loop counters 
short unsigned int n=pow(2,elementLen)/ 
SHA hash; 
//Need to reproduce the x matrix 
byte **x = new byte *[xyLen]; 
ford = 0; i < xyLen; i++) 
x[i] = new byte[SHA::DIGESTSIZE]; 
produceX(x); 
//make the y matrix from the x matrix 
for(i=0; i<xyLen; i++) 
^ hash.CalculateDigest(yTemp[i] , x[i], SHA::DIGESTSIZE) ; 
for(j=l; j<n; j++) 
hash.CalculateDigest(yTemp[i] , yTemp[i], 
SHA::DIGESTSIZE); 
//Generates the public y matrix and puts it in the argument yTemp 
//Each y is a SHA digest of the corresponding x. 
//The y matrix is based on the x matrix given as an argument 
void WinternitzShort::produceY(byte ** yTemp, byte ** x) { 
short unsigned int i, j;//loop counters 
short unsigned int n=pow(2,elementLen); 
SHA hash; 
for(i=0; i<xyLen; i++) 
hash.CalculateDigest(yTemp[i], x[i], SHA::DIGESTSIZE); 




//Creating the signature involves hashing each x[i] as many 
//times as the value in subVal[i].The result is stored in the 
//argument signature[i]. Returns false if the signature 
//can not be made, and true otherwise 
bool WinternitzShort::produceSignature(byte ** signature) 
if(subVal==NULL)//There is no message to produce a signature on 
return false; 
short unsigned int i, j, k;//loop counters 
SHA hash; 
//Need to reproduce the x matrix 
byte **x = new byte *[xyLen]; 
for(i =0; i < xyLen; i++) 
x[i] = new byte[SHA::DIGESTSIZE]; 
produceX(x); 
//Create the signature 
for(i=0; i<xyLen; i++)//Once for each x (and y and subVal) 
^ //The x[i] is hashed subVal[i] times and put 
//into signature[i] 
if(subVal[i]>0) 
^ hash.CalculateDigest(signature[i], x[i], 
SHA::DIGESTSIZE); 
//j=0 have been done on the line above 
for(j=l; j<subVal[i]; j++) hash.CalculateDigest(signature[i], 
signature [i], 
SHA::DIGESTSIZE); 
ilse//subVal[i] can be 0 in the check sum. 
for(k=0; k<SHA::DIGESTSIZE; k++) 
signature [i] [k]=x[i] [k] ; 
} return 1; 
} 
„ HIP funtion above, except the x matrix is 
the produced by the funtions. This 
//saves time. 
//Returns false if the siganture can not be made, and true otherwise 
bool WinternitzShort::produceSignature(byte ** signature, byte **x) 
if(subVal==NULL)//There is no message to produce a signature on 
return false; 
short unsigned int i, j, k;//loop counters 
SHA hash; 
//Create the signature 
for(i=0; i<xyLen; i++)//Once for each x (and y and subVal) { 





//j=0 have been done on the line above 





else//subVal[i] can be 0 in the check sum. 
for(k=0; k<SHA::DIGESTSIZE; k++) 




//Each signature object must only be used on one message. 
//Update can not be called on an object that have had x produced 
//already. Returns false if x has been produced before. 
//Returns true otherwise. 
bool WinternitzShort::update(byte messDigest[], short unsigned int 
messDigestLen) { 
//Security check 
//Comment out if several updates must be called to 
// time the operations 
if(subVal!=NULL) 
return false; 
//Split the bytes in m into shorter elements. 
//Used to find number of hashes needed for signing 
xyLen=(digestLen+checkLen)*elementPerByte; 
//Long enough to hold the digest plus checksum 
subVal = new byte [xyLen]; 





//Copies the public y matrix into the argument yTemp 
void WinternitzShort::getY(byte ** yTemp) 
^ produceY(yTemp); 
//The public parts of the siganture (the y and signature matrices) 
//are copied into the arguments. Returns false if the signature can 
//not be made. Returns true otherwise. 
bool WinternitzShort::getSignature(byte **sign, byte **yTemp) { 
short unsigned i; 
//Need to reproduce the x matrix 
byte **x = new byte *[xyLen]; 
for(i = 0; i < xyLen; i++) 







//Tests if the recieved signature is a valid one for the message 
//(subVal) in ths signatureobject. Returns -1 if the signature 
//can not be made, 0 if the tet fails and 1 otherwise 
short WinternitzShort::verifySignature(byte **testSign) 
^ if(!subVal)//There is no message to produce a signature on 
return -1; 
SHA hash; 
unsigned short i, j;//loop counters 
int n=pow(2,elementLen); 
byte ** y = new byte *[xyLen]; 
//Need to make y 
for(i =0; i < xyLen; i++) 
y[i] = new byte[SHA::DIGESTSIZE]; 
produceY(y); 
byte tempCheck[SHA:iDIGESTSIZE] ; 
for(i=0; i<xyLen; i++)//Once for each hash value 
^ for(j=0; j<SHA::DIGESTSIZE; j++) tempCheck[j]=testSign[i] [j] ; 
//hash tempCheck until it should be the same as 
//the corresponding y 
for(j=subVal[i]; j<n; j++) hash CalculateDigest(tempCheck, tempCheck, SHA::DIGESTSIZE); 
//It is faster to check the digest "manually" 
//rather then calling hash.VerifyDigest() 
for(j=0; j<SHA::DIGESTSIZE; j++) 
if(y[i] [j] 1=tempCheck[j ] ) 
return 0; 
} return 1; 
} 
//Tests if the recieved signature and y matrix form a valid signature 
//for the message (subVal) in ths signatureobject. Returns -1 if the 
//signature can not be made, 0 if the tet fails and 1 otherwise 
short WinternitzShort::verifySignature(byte **testSign, byte **y) 
if(!subVal)//There is no messge to produce a signature on 
return -1; 




for(i=0; i<xyLen; i++)//Once for each hash value { 
for(j=0; j<SHA:iDIGESTSIZE; j++) 
tempCheck[j]=testSign[i][j]; 
for(j=subVal[i]; j<n; j++) 
hash.CalculateDigest(tempCheck, tempCheck, 
SHA::DIGESTSIZE); 
//It is faster to check the digest "manually" rather then 
//calling hash.VerifyDigest() 
for(j=0; j<SHA::DIGESTSIZE; j++) 
if(y[i][j]!=tempCheck[j]) 
return 0; } 
return 1; 
} 
//Tests if the received signature and y matrix form a valid signature 
//for the received message. Used on an empty WinternitzShort object 
//made by the default constructor 
short WinternitzShort::verifySignature(byte messDigest[], byte 
**testSign, byte **y) 
short unsigned subLen=(digestLen+checkLen)*elementPerByte; 
subVal = new byte [subLen]; 
//Make the subVal matrix based on the messDigest 
computeSubVal(messDigest); 
makeCheckSum(); 
unsigned short i, j;//loop counters 
int n=pow(2,elementLen); 
SHA hash; 
byte tempCheck[SHA::DIGESTSIZE] ; 
for(i=0; i<xyLen; i++)//Once for each hash value 
^ for(j=0; j<SHA::DIGESTSIZE; j++) tempCheck[j]=testSign[i][j]; 
for(j=subVal[i]; j<n; j++) 
hash CalculateDigest(tempCheck, tempCheck, 
SHA::DIGESTSIZE); 
//It is faster to check the digest "manually" rather 
//then calling hash.VerifyDigest() 
for(j=0; j<SHA::DIGESTSIZE; j++) 
if(y[i] [j] !=tempCheck [ j]) 
return 0; 
^ return 1; 
class Node 
*node.h 
*Done as a part of the thesis: "Aspects of Micropayments" by Terje 
*Tollisen for his Master of Science (Honours) at University of 
*Wollongong. 










Node(int depth, float face, int n, Node* child=NULL); 
void setChild(Node * c); 
void getld(byte ID[]); 
int getDepthO {return depth;} 
float getFace0{return face;} 
int getChainLenO{return chainLen;} 
int getlndexO {return index;} 
bool getChildSignature(byte **sign, byte **yTemp) 
{return wChild.getSignature(sign, yTemp);} 
void getChainRoot(byte cr []); 
int getLink(byte link[]); 
int getLinkNext(byte link[]); 
private: 
void getChainEnd(byte cr[]); 





int depth;//Depth in the tree , ̂  v, 
float face;//Face value of each link in the local hash 
byte chainRoot[SHA:rDIGESTSIZE];//The root of the local 
byte chainEnd[SHA::DIGESTSIZE]; 
byte id[SHA::DIGESTSIZE]; 
int chainLen;//Length of the local hash chain 
int index///Current index of the local hash chain 
Winternitz wChild;//Signature object for the child node 
Node * child;//Points to the child node 
#endif 
/************************************************* *node.cpp 
*Done as a part of the thesis: "Aspects of Micropayments" by Terje 
*Tollisen for his Master of Science (Honours) at University of 
*Wollongong. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * / 















byte ** childY=new byte * [wChild.getxyLen()]; 
for(int i=0; i<wChild.getxyLen(); i++) 
childY[i] = new byte[SHA::DIGESTSIZE] ; 
//Get the public y values of the signature on the child 
wChild.getY(childY); 
SHA hash;//A SHA object that will be used for hashing 
//Will hold temporary hash values 
byte childTempiSHA:iDIGESTSIZE]; 
byte chainTemp[SHA::DIGESTSIZE] ; 
byte faceTemp[SHA::DIGESTSIZE] ; 
int j=0; 
//Put all the public y values into the childTemp array 
//and make a digest (into the same array) 
for(j=0; j<wChild.getxyLen(); j++) 
hash.Update(childY[j], SHA::DIGESTSIZE); 
hash.Final(ChiIdTemp); 
//The face value must be part of the id 
hash.Update(chainRoot, SHA::DIGESTSIZE); 
hash.Final(chainTemp); 
//The face value must be part of the id 
hash.Update((unsigned char*)¿face, sizeof(float) 
hash.Final(faceTemp); 
//Make a new digest out of the temporary ones 












void Node::generateChain() { 
//Make the random end of the hash chain 
AutoSeededRandomPool rng; 
rng.GenerateBlock(chainEnd, SHA::DIGESTSIZE) ;. 
SHA hash; 
//The root is at least on hash "away" form the end 
hash.CalculateDigest(chainRoot, chainEnd, SHA::DIGESTSIZE); 
//Produce the rest of the links in the hash chain, 
//ending up with root for(int j=l; j<chainLen-l; j++) 
hash.CalculateDigest(chainRoot, chainRoot, 
SHA::DIGESTSIZE); 
void Node::getChainEnd(byte ce[] ) 
for(short unsigned int i=0; i<SHA::DIGESTSIZE; i++: 
ce[i]=chainEnd[i]; 
Node * Node::getChild() 
return child; 
/ / / / f u n c t i o n s / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / I I I 
void Node::getld(byte ID[]) 
for(short unsigned int i=0; i<SHA::DIGESTSIZE; i++) 
ID[i]=id[i] ; } 
void Node:rgetChainRoot(byte cr[]) { 
for(short unsigned int i=0; i<SHA::DIGESTSIZE; i++) 
cr[i]=chainRoot[i]; } 
int Node::getLink(byte link[]) { 
if(index==chainLen)//end of chain 
return -1; 
for(short unsigned int k=0; k<SHA::DIGESTSIZE/ k++) 
link[k]=chainEnd[k]; 
for(int j=l; j<chainLen-index; j++) 
SHAO .CalculateDigest(link, link, SHA::DIGESTSIZE); 
} 
return index; 
int Node::getLinkNext(byte link[]) { 
if(index==chainLen)//end of chain 
return -1; 
for(short unsigned int k=0; k<SHA::DIGESTSIZE; k++) 
link[k]=chainEnd[k] ; 
for(int j=l; j<chainLen-index; j++) 
SHAO .CalculateDigest(link, link, SHA::DIGESTSIZE); 
return index++;//Return the current index of this link, then 
advance the index } 
class Tree 
»Don^L a part of the thesis: "Aspects of Micropayn^ents" by Terje 




class Tree { 
public: 
Tree(); 
void insertNode(float face, int n);//, Node* c=NULL); 
int getDepth0{return endPtr->getDepth();} 
void getRootId(byte ID[]){rootPtr->getId(ID);} 
bool up(); 
bool down(); 




float getCurrentFace0{return currentPtr->getFace();} 
int getCurrentDepthO{return currentPtr->getDepth();} 
int getCurrentChainLenO{return currentPtr-
>getChainLen()/} 
int getCurrentlndexO{return currentPtr->getlndex();} 
void getCurrentId(byte ID[]){currentPtr->getId(ID);} 
void getCurrentChainRoot(byte cr[]) 
{currentPtr->getChainRoot(cr);} 
int getCurrentLink(byte link[]) 
{return currentPtr->getLink(link);} 
int getCurrentLinkNext(byte link[]) 
{return currentPtr->getLinkNext(link);} 
bool getCurrentSignature(byte **sign, byte **yTemp) 
{return currentPtr->getChildSignature(sign, yTemp);} 





Node * rootPtr; 
Node * currentPtr; 




*Done as a part of the thesis: "Aspects of Micropayments" by Terje 
*Tollisen for his Master of Science (Honours) at University of 
*Wollongong. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * / 
#include "tree.h" 
//#include <iostream.h> 
Tree ::Tree() { 
rootPtr=NULL; 
current Pt r=NULL; 
endPtr=NULL/ 
} 
void Tree::insertNode(float face, int n) 
if(rootPtr==NULL) 
{ 

































void Tree::start 0 
currentPtr=rootPtr; 
void Tree : : end() 
currentPtr=endPtr; 
Test program 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * / * * * * * * * * * * * * * * • 
* D o n ^ 2 ^ a part of the thesis: "Aspects of Micropayments" by Terje 
























void nodeTiming(int max, int inc, int len); 
void printTree(Tree t); 
bool verifyLink(byte root[] , byte link[], int i); 
bool verifyChild(byte **sign, byte **y, byte*childID); 
bool verifyChild(byte **sign, byte **y, byte**childY, 
byte*childChainRoot, float face, int signLen); 
void hashChainTiming(int max, int inc); 
void randomTiming(int max, int inc) ; 
void winternitzTest(); 
void winternitzTiming(int max, int inc); 
void winternitzShortTest0; 
void winternitzShortTiming(int max, int inc)/ 
void makeKeys(); 
void signingTest(int max, int inc); 
int main(int argc, char* argv[]) 
int max=0, inc=0, len=0; 
char command[10]; 
if(argc==l) 
^ cout<<endl<<"Enter a command option (h for help):"; 
cin>>command; 




) ) else { 
strcpy((char*)command,argv[1]); 
if(argc>2) 
m a x = a t o i ( a r g v [ 2 ] ) ; 
if(argc>3) 
inc = a t o i ( a r g v [ 3 ] ) ; 
if(argc>4) 
l e n = a t o i ( a r g v [ 4 ] ) ; 
if(inc<=0) 
i n c = m a x ; 
} 
i f ( s t r c m p ( c o m m a n d , "h")==0) 
{ 
h e l p ( ) ; 
c o u t < < e n d l ; 
r e t u r n 0; 
} 
i f ( s t r c m p ( c o m m a n d , "tt")==0) 
{ 
t r e e T e s t ( ) ; 
c o u t < < e n d l ; 
r e t u r n 0; 
} 
i f ( s t r c m p ( c o m m a n d , "mtt")==0) 
{ 
m a n u a l T r e e T e s t ( ) ; 
c o u t < < e n d l ; 
r e t u r n 0; 
) 
i f ( s t r c m p ( c o m m a n d , "wt")==0) 
{ 
w i n t e r n i t z T e s t ( ) ; 
cout<<endl/ 
r e t u r n 0; 
} 
i f ( s t r c m p ( c o m m a n d , "wst")==0) 
{ 
w i n t e r n i t z S h o r t T e s t ( ) ; 
c o u t < < e n d l ; 
r e t u r n 0; 
) 
i f ( s t r c m p ( c o m m a n d , "mk")==0) 
{ 
m a k e K e y s ( ) ; 
c o u t < < e n d l ; 
r e t u r n 0; 
} 
i f ( a r g c = = l ) 
c o u t < < " M a x n u b m e r of iterations: 
c i n > > m a x ; 
c o u t < < " S i z e of increments: 
c i n > > i n c ; 
} 
i f ( s t r c m p ( c o m m a n d , "nt")==0) 
^ if(len==0) 
^ c o u t < < " L e n g t h of h a s h chain: 
cin>>len; 
} 
























cout<<endl; return 0; 
void helpO { 
c o u t « e n d l « " P r o g r a m takes 1. 2 or 3 arguments." 
« e n d l « " F i r s t argument is a letter code for which 
<<operation \n\tto perform:" _ 
<<endl<<"-tt:\tPerform a test on a signature chain as 
<<"described \n\tin Chapter 5." 
<<endl<<"-mtt:\tPerform a manual test on a signature 
<<"chain as \n\tdescribed in Chapter 5." 
« e n d l « " + n t : \ t T e s t the time it takes to make a node 
«"with a given \n\tnumber size hash chain." 
<<endl«"+hct:\tTest the time it takes to make and verify 
aiven \n\tnumber of hashes." . . . 
<<end?<<"+rt:\tTest the time it takes to initialise a " 
«"random \n\tnumber and do pseudo ramdom operations • 
<<enS<<"-wt:\tPerform tests on the implementation of the 




<<"\n\tthe Winternitz class." 
<<endl<<"-wst:\tPerform tests on the implementation of 
<<"\n\tWinternitzShort class." <<endl<<"+wsti:\tTest the time it takes to do operations 
<<"on \n\tthe WinternitzShort class." 
<<endl<<"+mk:\tTest the time it takes to make an 
<<"and \n\ta DSA(1024) key pair." 
<<endl<<"+st:\tTest the time it takes to do a given 
number " 
chain 
<<"of \n\tRSA and DSA operations."; 
cout<<endl<<endl<<"The commands marked with a - takes only one 
<<"\nargument (the command option)" 
<<endl<<"The commands marked with a + can take one or two 
<<"more options:" 
<<endl<<"l) m a x nubmer of iterations" 
<<endl<<"2) size of increment"; 
cout<<endl<<endl<<"The arguments \"htc 10000\" w i l l casue the " 
<<"program to \ndo tests on 10000 hash chain operatios" 
<<endl<<"The arguments \"htc 10000 5000\" w i l l casue the 
<<"program to \ndo tests on 5000 and then 10000 hash 
II 
<<"operatios" 
<<endl<<"And so on."; 











byte ** testY=new byte*[signSize] ; 
byte ** testSign=new byte*[signSize] ; 
byte ** testChildy=new byte*[signSize] ; 
byte * testChildRoot=new byte[signSize] ; 
float testChildFace; 
for(i=0; i<signSize; i++) 
^ testY[i]=new byte[SHA::DIGESTSIZE] ; 
testSign[i]=new byte[SHA::DIGESTSIZE]; 




for(i=i; i<=tree.getDepth(); i++) 
tree.getCurrentSignature(testSign, testY); 
if(¡tree.down 0) { 







if(IverifyChild(testSign, testY, testChildY, 
testChildRoot, testChildPace, signSize)) 
{ 
test=false; 
cout<<endl<<"Signature on child "<<i<<" failed"; 
} 
else 
cout<<endl<<"Signature on child "<<i<<" ok"; 
if(IverifyChild(testSign, testY, testid)) { 
test=false; 





cout<<endl<<"Signature on child's id "<<i<<" ok"; 
//Make payments 
cout<<endl<<endl<<"Payment tests"; 
byte tempLink[SHA:cDIGESTSIZE] ; 
byte * chainRoot=new byte[signSize]; 
int index; 






if(index==-l)//end of chain 
^ cout<<endl<<"End of chain"; 
break; 
if(!verifyLink(ChainRoot, tempLink, index)) 
^ test=false; 
cout<<endl<<"Link verification failed"; 
} 
else cout<<endl<<"Link verification ok"; 
if(! tree.down 0) { 





cout<<endl<<endl<<"All tests ran as expected"; 
else 




void manualTreeTest() { 
clock_t tl, t2; 
tl =clock(); 
Tree tree; 
int length;//Length of chain to insert 
float face;//Face value for the chain to insert 
t2 =clock(); 
//Build the tree 
while(true) { 
tl=clock(); 
cout<<endl<<"Inserting new node (0 or less to exit):"; 


















//Variables needed to test the tree signatures 
int signSize=tree.getSignatureSize() ; 
int i; 
byte testId[SHA::DIGESTSIZE]; 
** testY=new byte* [signSize] ; 
ĵ ŷ g ** testSign=new byte* [signSize] ; 
byte ** testChildY=new byte*[signSize]; 
ĵ ŷ g * testChildRoot=new byte [signSize] ; 
float testChildPace; 
//Allocate memory 
for(i=0; i<signSize/ i++) 
testY[i]=new byte[SHA::DIGESTSIZE]; 
testSign[i]=new byte[SHA::DIGESTSIZE] ; 
testChildY[i]=new byte[SHA::DIGESTSIZE]; } 
//Test the signatures on the nodes 
cout<<endl<<endl<<"Test the signatures on the nodes:"; 
tree.start(); 
while(true) { 
//Get the siganture of the parent node 
tree.getCurrentSignature(testSign, testY); 
//Move the current point one down; to the child 
if(!tree.down()) 
break; 




//Test the Winternitz signature on the public 
//parts of the child node 
if(IverifyChild(testSign, testY, testChildY, 
testChildRoot, testChildPace, signSize)) 
cout<<endl<<"Signature on node " 
<<tree.getCurrentDepth() 
<<" public components failed"; 
else 
cout<<endl<<"Signature on node " 
<<tree.getCurrentDepth() 
<<" public components ok"; 
//Test the Winternitz signature on the id number 
//of the child node 
tree.getCurrentId(testid); 
if(¡verifyChild(testSign, testY, testid)) 
cout<<endl<<"Signature on node " 
<<tree.getCurrentDepth0<<" id failed"; 
else 
cout<<endl<<"Signature on node " 




byte * chainRoot=new byte[signSize]; 
int index; 
while(true) 
^ printTree(tree) ; 









if(face == tree.getCurrentFace 






if(verifyLink(chainRoot, tempLink, index)) 
cout<<endl<<"Link verification ok"; 
else 
cout<<endl<<"Link verification failed"; 
break; 
if(!tree.down()) { 
cout<<endl<<"No such value found"; 
cout<<endl<<"To insert a new node with 
value "<<face<<","; 
cout<<endl<<"type length of the new 














void printTree(Tree t) 
{ cout<<endl<<"The tree structure:"; 
t.start(); 
while(true) 
{ cout < < endl< <"Depth: "«t.getCurrentDepth()« 
" Face= "<<t.getCurrentFace0<< 
" Length= "<<t.getCurrentChainLen()<< 
" Index= "<<t.getCurrentlndex0 ; 
if ( ! t .downO ) 
break; 
} 
//Use public information to verify a link in a hash chain, compared 
to the root of the chain 
bool verifyLink(byte root[], byte link[], int i) 
byte temp[SHA::DIGESTSIZE]; 
for(int k=0; k<SHA::DIGESTSIZE; k++) 
temp[k]=link[k]; 
if(i>0)//link is root 
for(int j=0; j<i; j++) 
SHAO .CalculateDigest(temp, temp, SHA:iDIGESTSIZE); 
for(int j=0; j<SHA:rDIGESTSIZE; j++) 
if(root[j]!=temp[j]) 
return false; 
return true; } 
//Tests if the arguments sign and y makes a valid 
//Wintetnitz signature on childID 
bool verifyChild(byte **sign, byte **y, byte*childID) { 
Winternitz testSign(childID, SHA::DIGESTSIZE, y); 
if(!testSign.verifySignature(sign)) 
return false; 
return true; } 
//Computes the id of the child node form the arguments 
//childY, childChainRoot and face. Tests if the arguments sign 
//and y makes a valid Wintetnitz signature on that id 
bool verifyChild(byte **sign, byte **y, byte**childY, 
byte*childChainRoot, float face, int signLen) { 
SHA hash;//A SHA object that will be used for hashing 
//Will hold temporary hash values 
byte chainTemp[SHA::DIGESTSIZE] ; 
byte childTemp[SHA::DIGESTSIZE]; 
byte faceTemp[SHA::DIGESTSIZE]; 
byte id[SHA::DIGESTSIZE] ; 
int j=0; 
//Put all the public y values into the 
//childTemp array and make a digest (intot he same array) 
for(j=0; j<signLen; j++) 
hash.Update(childY[j], SHA::DIGESTSIZE); 
hash.Final(childTemp); 
//The denomination of each link must be part of the id 
hash.Update(childChainRoot, SHA::DIGESTSIZE); 
hash.Final(chainTemp); 
//The denomination of each link must be part of the id 
hash.Update((unsigned char*)&face, sizeof(float)); 
hash.Final(faceTemp); 
//Make a new digest out of the temporary ones. This new digest 









//Times how long it takes to make a new signature node 
//with a given length of the hash chain 
void nodeTiming(int max, int inc, int len) { 
cout<<endl<<"Node timing"<<endl; 
clock_t tl, t2; 






for( i=inc; i<=max; i+=inc) 
{ tl=clock(); 
for(j=0; j<i; j++) 
tree.insertNode((float) 1.1, len) ; 
t2=clock 0; 




//Times how long it takes to produce a hash chain with a 
//given number of links 
void hashChainTiming(int max, int inc) 
^ cout<<endl<<"Hash chain timing"<<endl; 
clock_t tl, t2; 
SHA hash; 
tl=clock(); 
byte ml[SHA: :DIGESTSIZE] ; 
byte m2 [SHA::DIGESTSIZE]; 
AutoSeededRandomPool rng; 
rng.GenerateBlock(ml, SHA::DIGESTSIZE);//Make the message 
int i, j;//loop counters 
t2 =clock(); 
for( i=inc; i<=max; i+=inc) 
^ tl=clock(); 
for{j=0; j<i/ j++) 
hash.CalculateDigest(ml, ml, SHA::DIGESTSIZE); 
t2=clock()/ 
cout<<"Make a SHA-1 hash chain of length\t" 
<<j<<"\t=\t" 
^ <<(float)(t2-tl)/CLOCKS_PER_SEC<<"\tseconds"<<endl; 
MD5 md5; for( i=inc; i<=max; i+=inc) 
tl=clock(); 
for(j=0; j<i/ j++) 
md5 .CalculateDigest (ml, ml, SHA: .-DIGESTSIZE)/ 
t2=clock()/ 
cout<<"Make a MD5 hash chain of length\t" 
<<j<<"\t=\t" 
^ <<(float)(t2-tl)/CLOCKS_PER_SEC<<"\tseconds"<<endl; 
cout<<endl<<"Hash chain verification timing"; 
hash.CalculateDigest(m2, ml, SHA::DIGESTSIZE) ; 
//m2 is now a digest of ml 
//Test if m2 a digest of ml? 
if (ihash.VerifyDigest(m2, ml, SHA::DIGESTSIZE)) { 
cout<<endl<<"Hash verification failed"<<endl; 
return; } 
else 
cout<<endl<<"Hash verification ok"<<endl; 
for(i=inc; i<=max; i+=inc) { 
tl=clock(); 
for(j=0; j<i; j++) 
//Test if m2 a digest of ml? 
if (!hash.VerifyDigest(m2, ml, SHA::DIGESTSIZE)) { 
cout<<endl<<"Hash verification failed while 
calling 
} 




cout<<"Verify\t"<<j<<"\thash values with testing=\t" 
<<(float)(t2-tl)/CLOCKS_PER_SEC<<"\tseconds"<<endl; 
hash.CalculateDigest(ml, ml, SHA::DIGESTSIZE); 
//ml and m2 should now be equal 
cout<<endl; 
int k=0; 
for(i=inc*10; i<=max*10; i+=inc*10) 
^ tl=clock(); 
for(j=0; j<i; j++) { 
for(k=0; k<SHA::DIGESTSIZE; k++) 
if(ml [k] !=m2[k]) { 
cout < < endl< <"error"; 
return; } } 
t2=clock(); 
cout<<"Verify\t"<<j<<"\thash values manually=\t" 
<<(float)(t2-tl)/CLOCKS_PER_SEC<<"\tseconds"<<endl; 
} 
//Times how long it takes to initsialize a random number generator 
//and to make a given number of pseudo random numbers 
void randomTiming(int max, int inc) { 
cout<<endl<<"Random number generation"; 
clock_t tl, t2; 
tl=clock(); 
t2 =clock(); 
cout<<endl<<"Test zero time=\t" 
<<(float)(t2-tl)/CLOCKS_PER_SEC<<"\tseconds"<<endl; 
int i,j; 




for(i=inc; i<=max; i+=inc) { 
tl=clock 0 ; 




<<"\trandom number generators=\t" 
<<(float)(t2-tl)/CLOCKS_PER_SEC<<"\tseconds"<<endl; 
} 
for(i=inc; i<=max; i+=inc) { 
tl=clock(); 





<<"\trandom number generator and get a long=\t" 
«(float) (t2-tl)/CL0CKS_PER_SEC«"\tseconds"«endl; 
for(i=inc; i<=max; i+=inc; 
^ tl=clock(); 
for(j=0; j<i; j++) rng.GenerateBlock(mess, SHA::DIGESTSIZE); 
t2=clock(); 
cout < <"Generate\t"< < j < < 
"\trandom numbers of size SHASIZE=\t" 
<<(float) (t2-tl)/CLOCKS_PER_SEC<<"\tseconds"<<endl; 
void winternitzTest() { 
int i=0/ 
bool test=true; 
//A sub element has a values less then n. 
const short unsigned int n = pow(2,elementLen); 
const short unsigned int messLen=SHA: .-DIGESTSIZE; 
byte mess[messLen];//The message who's digest will be signed 
//Generating a random message 
AutoSeededRandomPool rng; 
rng.GenerateBlock(mess, SHA::DIGESTSIZE); 
//Creating the digest of the message 
byte m [SHA::DIGESTSIZE];//Will hold the digest of the message 
SHA () .CalculateDigest(m, mess, messLen); 
Winternitz Wl(m, SHA::DIGESTSIZE)/ 
cout<<endl<<"Wl is a Winternitz sigantue 
object:Winternitz Wl(m, SHA::DIGESTSIZE)"; 
cout<<endl<<"Self verification on W1 should be ok"/ 
if(!W1.verifySignature()) { 
test=false; 
cout<<endl<<"Signature on W1 failed"; 
} 
else 
cout<<endl<<"Signature on W1 ok"; 
Winternitz W2; 
cout<<endl<<"W2 is an empty Winternitz sigantue object." 
<<endl<<"Calling W2.update(m, SHA::DIGESTSIZE)"; 
W2.update(m, SHA::DIGESTSIZE); 
cout<<endl<<"Self verification on W2 should be ok"; 
if(!W2.verifySignature 0 ) { 
test=false; 
cout<<endl<<"Signature on W2 failed"; 
} 
else 
cout<<endl<<"Signature on W2 ok"; 
//Generate varables need for siganture testing 
short unsigned int signLen=W2.getxyLen(); 
byte ** sign=new byte * [signLen]; 
byte *subVal=new byte [signLen]; 
short unsigned int subLen=W2.getxyLen(); 
byte **y=new byte *[signLen];;; 
short testValue; 
//Allocate memory 
for(i=0; i<signLen; i++) { 
y[i]=newbyte [SHA::DIGESTSIZE]; 
sign[i]=new byte [SHA:iDIGESTSIZE]; 
cout<<endl<<"Get the public y and sign 
fromW2: W2.getSignature(sign, y)"; 
W2.getSignature(sign, y); 
cout<<endl<<"W3 is a Winternitz testing 
sigantue: Winternitz W3(m, SHA:rDIGESTSIZE, y)"; 
Winternitz W3(m, SHA::DIGESTSIZE, y); 
cout<<endl<<"Use W3 to test the sign from W2. 
Signaute test should be ok"; 
if(IW3.verifySignature(sign)) { 
test=false; 
cout<<endl<<"Signature on W3 failed"; } 
else 
cout<<endl<<"Signature on W3 ok"; 
sign [0] [0]++; 
cout<<endl<<"Change a nubmer in sign, to make a miss match" 
<<endl<<"Siganture on W3 should now fail"; 
if(!W3.verifySignature(sign)) 
cout<<endl<<"Signature on W3 failed"; else { 
test=false; 
cout<<endl<<"Signature on W3 ok"; } 
cout<<endl<<"W4 is an empty Winternitz 
sigantue object: Winternitz W4"; 
Winternitz W4; 
cout<<endl<<"Calling W4.verifySignature()" 
<<endl<<"This siganture does not exist, 
the operation and should not be completed."; 
testValue=W4.verifySignature(); 
if(testValue==-l) 









cout<<endl<<"Signature on W4 ok"; 
} 
if (test) 
cout<<endl<<endl<<"All tests ran as expected"; 
else 
cout<<endl<<endl<<"One or more tests did not 
go as expected"; 
} 
tl=clock(); 






Winternitz testW(m, SHA:iDIGESTSIZE, tempY); 
if(!testW,verifySignature(tempSign) ) { 
cout<<endl<<"Test signature failed. Abnormal Abort"; 
return; } 
//Verif the Winternitz siganture on a signature object 
for(i=inc; i<=max; i+=inc) { 
tl=clock(); 








//A sub element has a values less then n. 
const short unsigned int n = pow(2,elementLen); 
const short unsigned int messLen=SHA::DIGESTSIZE; 
byte mess[messLen];//The message whos digest will be signed 
bool test=true; 
//Generating a random message 
AutoSeededRandomPool rng; 
rng.GenerateBlock(mess, SHA:iDIGESTSIZE); 
//Creating the digest of the message 
byte m [SHA::DIGESTSIZE];//Will hold the digest of the message 
S H A O .CalculateDigest (m, mess, messLen) ; 
WinternitzShort Wl(m, SHA::DIGESTSIZE) ; 
cout<<endl<<"Wl is a WinternitzShort 
object:WinternitzShort Wl(m, SHA::DIGESTSIZE) . " ; 
//Generate varables need for siganture testing 
short unsigned int signLen=Wl.getxyLen(); 
byte ** sign=new byte * [signLen]; 
byte *subVal=new byte [signLen]; 
byte **y=new byte *[signLen]; 
short testValue; 
//Tiems how long it takes to do different actions on a 
//Winternitz signature 
void winternitzTiming(int max, int inc) 
cout<<endl<<"Winternitz timing. lementLen=\t"<<elementLen; 




//A sub element has a values less then n. 
const short unsigned int n = pow(2,elementLen); 
const short unsigned int messLen=SHA::DIGESTSIZE; 
byte mess[messLen];//The message who's digest will be signed 
//Generating a random message 
AutoSeededRandomPool rng; 
rng.GenerateBlock(mess, SHA: :DIGESTSIZE); 
//Creating the digest of the message 
byte m [SHA::DIGESTSIZE]; 





//Makes an empty Winternitz siganture 
for(i=inc; i<=max; i+=inc) { 
tl=clock(); 
for(j=0; j<i; j++) 
Winternitz W; 
t2=clock 0; 
cout<<"Make\t"<<j<<"\tempty wintertnitz signatures=\t" 
<<(float)(t2-tl)/CLOCKS_PER_SEC<<"\tseconds"<<endl; 
} //Updates an empty Winternitz siganture 
for(i=inc; i<=max; i+=inc) { 
Winternitz W; 
tl=clock 0; 
for(j=0; j<i; j++) 
W.update(m, SHA: :DIGESTSIZE) ; 
t2=clock(); 
cout<<"Update\t"<<j<<"\terapty wintertnitz signatures=\t' 
<<(float)(t2-tl)/CLOCKS_PER_SEC<<"\tseconds"<<endl; 
//Makes a Winternitz siganture 
for(i=inc/ i<=max; i+=inc) 
tl=clock(); 
for(j=0; j<i; j++) 




<< (float) ( t 2 - t l ) / C L 0 C K S _ P E R _ S E C « " \ t s e c o n d s " < < e n d l ; 
} 
//Makes a Winternitz siganture and does the self 
//verification test 
for(i=inc; i<=max; i+=inc) 
tl=clock(); 
for(j=0; j<i; j++) { 
Winternitz W(m, SHA: :DIGESTSIZE) ; 
if(!W.verifySignature()) { 
cout<<endl<<"Signature failed"; 





//Create the temporary variables need to verify a 
//signature 
Winternitz tempW(m, SHA::DIGESTSIZE); 
short unsigned int len=tempW.getxyLen(); 
byte ** tempSign=new byte * [len]/ 
byte *tempSubVal=new byte [len]; 
byte **tempY=new byte * [len]; 
for(i=0; i<len; i++) { 
terapY[i]=new byte [SHA::DIGESTSIZE]; 
tempSign[i]=new byte [SHA::DIGESTSIZE]; 
) 
//Gets the public parts of a Winternitz signature 
tempW.getSignature(tempSign, tempY); 
//Make Winternitz test-objects, used to veruty signatures. 
for(i=inc; i<=max; i+=inc) { 
tl=clock(); 
for(j=0; j<i; j++) 
Winternitz testW(m, SHA::DIGESTSIZE, tempY); 
t2=clock(); 
cout<<"Make\t"<<j<<"\twintertnitz test objects=\t" 
<<(float)(t2-tl)/CLOCKS_PER_SEC<<"\tseconds"<<endl; } 
//Gets the public parts of a WinternitzShort signature 
for(i=inc; i<=max; i+=inc) { 
tl=clock(); 







//Gets the public parts of a WinternitzShort signature 
for(i=inc; i<=max; i+=inc) 
for(int i=0; i<signLen; i++) 
y[i]=new byte [SHA::DIGESTSIZE]; 
^ sign[i]=new byte [SHA::DIGESTSIZE]; 
cout<<endl<<"Calling W1.getSignature(sign, y). Should be ok"; 
if(!W1.getSignature(sign, y)) 
test=false; 
cout<<endl<<"Could not get the siganture on Wl"; } 
else 
cout<<endl<<"getSignature(sign, y) ok"; 
cout<<endl<<"Calling Wl.verifySignature(sign)." 




cout<<endl<<"Signature verification on Wl 








cout<<endl<<"Signature on Wl ok"; 
cout<<endl; 
cout<<endl<<"Calling Wl.verifySignature(sign, y)." 




cout<<endl<<"Signature verification on Wl 
could not be completed"; } else 
if(testValue==0) { 
test=false; 




cout<<endl<<"Signature on Wl ok"; 
cout<<endl; 
WinternitzShort W2; v. • ^ 
cout«endl«"W2 is an empty test object. «endl«"Calling W2. verifySignature (m, sign, y) . 
<<endl<<"Signature on W2 should be ok"; 




cout<<endl<<"Signature verification on W2 




cout<<endl<<"Signature on W2 failed"; } 
else 
if(testValue==l) 
cout<<endl<<"Signature on W2 ok"; 
cout<<endl; 
cout<<endl<<"Changing a number in y to 
produce a failed signature"; 
if (y[0] [0] >0) 




cout<<endl<<"Calling W2.verifySignature(m, sign, y)." 




cout<<endl<<"Signature verification on 




cout<<endl<<"Signature on W2 failed"; 
if(testValue==l) { 
test=false; 




cout<<endl<<"W3 is an empty test object."; 
cout<<endl<<"Calling W3.getSignature(sign, y). 
Should not be able to get it"; 
if(!W3.getSignature(sign, y)) 
cout<<endl<<"Could not get the siganture on W3"; 
else { 
test = false; n n. ̂  • „ 
cout«endl<<"Got the siganture on W3. Abnormal behavior"; 
} 
if(test) ^ 
cout<<endl<<endl<<"All tests ran as expected ; 
else ^ , cout<<endl<<endl<<"One or more tests did 
not go as expected"; 
cout<<endl; 
^ return; 
//Times how long it takes to do different actions 
//on a WinternitzShort signature 
void winternitzShortTiming(int max, int inc) 
cout<<endl<<"WinternitzShort timing."<<endl; 
clock_t tl, t2; 
tl=clock(); 
//A sub element has a values less then n. 
const short unsigned int n = pow(2,elementLen); 
const short unsigned int messLen=SHA::DIGESTSIZE; 
byte mess[messLen];//The message whos digest will be signed 
//Generating a random message 
AutoSeededRandomPool rng; 
rng.GenerateBlock(mess, SHA::DIGESTSIZE); 
//Creating the digest of the message 
byte m [SHA::DIGESTSIZE]; 
SHA().CalculateDigest(m, mess, messLen); 
t2 =clock(); 
int i,j;//loop counters 
//Makes an empty WinternitzShort siganture 
for(i=inc; i<=max; i+=inc) { 
tl=clock(); 
for(j=0; j<i; j++) 
WinternitzShort W; 
t2=clock 0; 
cout<<"Make\t"<<j<<"\tempty wintertnitz signatures=\t" 
<<(float)(t2-tl)/CLOCKS_PER_SEC<<"\tseconds"<<endl; } 
//Updates an empty WinternitzShort siganture 
//Can normally only be done once on an empty object 
for(i=inc; i<=max; i+=inc) { 
WinternitzShort W; 
tl=clock(); 
for(j=0; j<i; j++) 
W.update(m, SHA::DIGESTSIZE); 
t2=clock 0 ; 
cout<<"Update\t"<<j 
<<"\tempty wintertnitz signatures=\t" 
<<(float)(t2-tl)/CLOCKS_PER_SEC<<"\tseconds"<<endl; 
} 
//Makes a WinternitzShort siganture 
for(i=inc; i<=max; i+=inc) { 
tl=clock 0; 
for(j=0; j<i; j++) 
WinternitzShort W(m, SHA::DIGESTSIZE); 
t2=clock(); 
cout<<"iyiake\t"<<j <<"\twintertnitz signature objects=\t" 
^ <<(float)(t2-tl)/CLOCKS_PER_SEC<<"\tseconds"<<endl; 
//Create the temporary variables needed to verify a siganture 
WinternitzShort tempW(m, SHA:iDIGESTSIZE); 
short unsigned int len=tempW.getxyLen(); 
byte ** tempSign=new byte * [len]; 
byte *tempSubVal=new byte [len]; 
byte **tempY=new byte * [len]; 
//Allocate memory 
for(i=0; i<len; i++) { 
tempY[i]=new byte [SUA: iDIGESTSIZE] / 
tempSign[i]=new byte [SHA::DIGESTSIZE]; } 
//Gets the public parts of a WinternitzShort signature 
tempW.getSignature(tempSign, tempY); 
//A signature testing object 
WinternitzShort testW; 
short testValue=testW.verifySignature(m, tempSign, tempY); 
if(testValue==-l) { 
cout<<endl<<"Test signature could not be completed. 
Abnormal abort"; 
return; } 
else if(testValue==0) { 
cout<<endl<<"Test signature failed. Abnormal abort"; 
return; } 
//Verify the WinternitzShort siganture (tempSign, tempY) 
//on the message m 
for(i=inc; i<=max; i+=inc) { 
tl = cloc]c 0 ; 
for(j=0; j<i; j++) 
testW.verifySignature(m, tempSign, tempY); 
t2=clock(); 




//Gets the public parts of a WinternitzShort signature. 
//This involves producing the signature 
for(i=inc; i<=max; i+=inc) { 
tl=cloc]c 0 ; 
for(j=0; j<i; j++) 
tempW.getSignature(tempSign, tempY); 
t2 = cloc]c() ; 
cout<<"Get (produce)\t"<<j 
<<"\twintertnitz signatures=\t" 
<<(float)(t2-tl)/CLOCKS PER SEC<<"\tseconds"<<endl; } " " 
//Gets the public y of a WinternitzShort signature. 
//This involves producing the y martrix 
for{i=inc; i<=max; i+=inc) { 
tl=clock(); 







void makeKeys() { 
clock_t tl, t2; 
tl=clock(); 
unsigned int keyLength=1024; 
const char *privRSAFilename="hexrsapriv.txt"/ 
const char *pubRSAFilename="hexrsapub.txt"; 
const char *privDSAFilename="hexdsapriv.txt"/ 
const char *pubDSAFilename="hexdsapub.txt"; 
const char *seed="456erty68ur"; 
t2=clock(); 
cout<<endl<<"Make keys timing"<<endl; 
//Make RSA keys 
tl=clock(); 
RandomPool randPool; 
randPool.Put((byte *)seed, strlen(seed)); 
RSAES_OAEP_SHA_Decryptor priv(randPool, keyLength); 








cout<<"Make RSA (1024) key pair=\t"<<(float)(t2-
tl)/CLOCKS_PER_SEC<<"\tseconds"<<endl; 
//Make DSA keys 
tl=clock(); 
randPool.Put((byte *)seed, strlen(seed) ) ; 
DSAPrivateKey dsaPrivate(randPool,keyLength); 




HexEncoder dsaPubFile(new FileSink(pubDSAFilename)); 
dsaPublic.DEREncode(dsaPubFile); 
t2=clock(); 
cout<<"Make DSA (1024) key pair=\t"<<(float)(t2-
tl)/CLOCKS_PER_SEC<<"\tseconds"<<endl; 
} 
void signingTest(int max, int ine) 
clock_t tl =clock(); 
const char *privRSAFilename="hexrsapriv. txt" ; 
const char *pubRSAFilename="hexrsapub.txt"; 
const char *privDSAFilename="hexdsapriv.txt"/ 
const char *pubDSAFilename="hexdsapub.txt"; 
int i=0; 
const char *seed="375rth5tdy"; 
long longseed; 
const int messLen=12; 






//randPool.Put ( (byte *)seed, strlen(seed))/ 
randPool.Put((byte*)¿longseed, strlen(seed)); 
byte * randomMssg=new byte[SHA:rDIGESTSIZE]; 
randPool.GenerateBlock(randomMssg, SHA::DIGESTSIZE); 
SHAO .CalculateDigest(digest, mess, messLen); 
GDSASigner<SHA> dsaSigner(FileSource(privDSAFilename, 
true, new HexDecoder)); 
GDSADigestSigner dsaDigestSigner(FileSource(privDSAFilename, 
true, new HexDecoder)); 
GDSADigestVerifier dsaDigestVerifier(FileSource(pubDSAFileñame, 
true, new HexDecoder)); 
RSASSA_PKCSlvl5_SHA_Signer rsaDigestSigner(FileSource 
(privRSAFilename, true, new HexDecoder)); 
RSASSA_PKCSlvl5_SHA_Verifier rsaDigestVerifier(FileSource 
(pubRSAFileñame, true, new HexDecoder)); 
int signDsaDigestLen=dsaSigner.SignatureLength() ; 
byte * signatureDsaDigest=new byte [signDsaDigestLen]; 
int signRsaDigestLen=rsaDigestSigner.SignatureLength(); 
byte * signatureRsaDigest=new byte [signRsaDigestLen] ; 
int rounds=max; 
clock t t2 =clock(); 
tl=clock(); 


























<<(float)(t2-tl)/CLOCKS PER SEC<<"\t"<<rounds<<endl; 
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